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Abstract  
The number of investor-state arbitration disputes has been on the rise since the mid 1990s. Their 
determinants are still not fully understood. This study empirically examines the effects of economic 
crises on investor-state arbitration claims, based on international investment agreements (IIAs). We 
use a unique dataset containing 961 investor-state arbitration claims covering 132 host (defendant) 
and 75 home (claimant) countries over the 1986-2017 period. We find that episodes of economic 
crises are positively and significantly associated with the number of investor-state arbitration cases 
and we uncover evidence that the type of economic crisis matters. In addition, the positive impact of 
economic crises on arbitration cases is inversely related to the rule of law in a host country. These 
results are consistent with the view that governments are prioritizing policy actions aiming at 
mitigating the negative impact of economic crises over compliance with their obligations in IIAs. From 
a policy perspective, our results suggest that besides strengthening the rule of law domestically, the 
IIA system should be reformed with a focus on avoiding a vicious circle, thus shortening the recovery 
period after economic crises. 
 
 
Keywords: Economic crises / International Economic Law / Investment Agreements / International 
Arbitration / International Relations 
 
JEL Codes: G01 Financial Crises / F21 International Investment and Long-Term Capital Movements / 
F55 International Institutional Arrangements / K33 International Law 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
We would like to thank Julien Chaisse for very helpful comments on legal issues concerning 
investment agreements. 
*) Corresponding author at: Department of Economics, WU Vienna University of Economics and 
Business, Vienna (Austria) 
E-mail address: bellak@wu.ac.at 
**) Austrian Institute of Economic Research  
E-mail address: markus.leibrecht@wifo.ac.at  
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
It is well known that shocks like crises exert negative impacts on the growth of investment in a country 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Aizenman et al 2013, Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017; Dibiasi et al. 2018), and 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular. For example, global FDI declined by 14% between 
2007/8 and even more strongly in 2009. (UNCTAD 2009, p. xix) FDI is generally considered an 
important external source of finance, although its relative importance has declined somewhat over 
the last decade. This belief is generally strong particularly in countries, which lack domestic investment 
and technology, which can be explained by their insufficient institutional and legal environment to a 
large extent (Hanson, 2010). 
While the possibility of positive effects from FDI inflows is heavily contested (see e.g., the meta-
analysis on productivity spillovers by Demena and Bergerijk, 2017), more and more countries have 
concluded international investment agreements (IIAs) as part of their FDI attraction strategy (see e.g., 
Elkins et al. 2004; Jandhyala et al. 2011). IIAs signal a willingness of host country governments to 
commit to obligations vis-à-vis foreign investors in the light of information asymmetries and dynamic 
inconsistencies.1 These lead to a credibility problem on the side of a host government and will have a 
serious impact on investment decisions by foreign investors. Given a lack of credibility, an efficient 
investment, which would otherwise have taken place, may not be carried out at all or be carried out 
in a non-optimal way (too small or too large). IIAs are a possible remedy for this problem. 
With the consequences of the economic and financial crisis 2008/9 hardly digested in many 
economies, governments are still struggling with appropriate measures to prevent future crises, inter 
alia by resorting to international treaties and agreements. (Ferrantino, 2006; Sacerdoti 2013) For 
example, “for developing countries in need of development capital, particularly in the wake of the 
1980s debt crisis, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)2 have become an attractive way to solidify 
confidence in potential foreign investors regarding nationalization, expropriation, creeping 
confiscation through regulatory changes3 or performance requirements like local content rules.” 
(Anderson, 2017) Put differently, a country’s willingness to sign a BIT “… was caused by the fact that 
                                                          
1 First, information asymmetry arises due to the fact that information about the true intentions of a government 
may be private, i.e. “when observers lack information about the beliefs and values that are motivating a 
government to pursue (…)” a certain policy (Tomz, 1997, p. 2). Second, a dynamic inconsistency problem arises 
from the conduct of democratic governments which need to hold elections from time to time and tend to 
discount  the long-term in favor of the short-term effects, especially in developing countries (Büthe and Milner, 
2008, p. 743)  
2 The vast majority of IIAs has been concluded on a bilateral (Bilateral Investment Treaties, BITs) level, a trilateral 
level (e.g. NAFTA) or regional level (e.g. Energy Charter Treaty). 
3 The risk of adverse regulatory changes ranks persistently as a top investor concern, as reported in the World 
Bank’s (2014) political risk survey. 
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BITs introduced a mechanism through which developing countries could compete for investment.“ 
(Guzman 1998)  
Yet, making bilateral treaties was by no means confined to developing countries only. Assuming that 
international relations are inherently conflictual in nature, one may conclude that governments trying 
to attract FDI reveal a certain degree of preparedness to comply with agreements in force. Particularly, 
countries with scarce capital and poor governance are thought to use BITs as a signal, as they compete 
heavily for FDI with a large number of alternative locations. (Guzman, 1998) 
Besides a set of substantial provisions (investors’ rights), BITs include procedural provisions (inter alia 
Investor State Dispute Settlement, ISDS), which allows for investor-state arbitration (and in some 
cases, in addition, state to state international arbitration) in case of a perceived violation of the rights 
secured to investors. Investor-state arbitration is a mechanism designed to solve conflicts between 
foreign investors and host country governments over the rights of investors (Simmons 2014; Sauvant 
2008) either in addition to the local judicial system (local courts) or by circumventing it (arbitration 
tribunals). Indeed, while the initial focus of IIAs was on protecting foreign property against unlawful 
expropriations, foreign investors “increasingly use international investment law as a means to 
challenge a broad range of host states’ regulatory policies, including, but not limited to, measures 
adopted to protect the environment, to promote public health, to implement national energy policies, 
and to combat economic crises.” (Sabanogullari 2016, p. 26) 
As a frequently mentioned example, Argentina faces several investor-state arbitration cases in the 
wake of its economic crisis in 2000-1. (Hopwood, 2018) It is important to note that Argentina is a 
prominent case4, but it is by far not the only case of a crisis-shaken host country experiencing an 
increase in the number of international arbitration cases. More recent investor-state arbitration cases 
in the context of crises relate to the sovereign debt crisis in Peru (2016, Hopwood 2018), Cyprus (2011-
2013, ibidem) and Greece (Kelly, 2018; Argyropoulou 2018), and the financial crisis in Spain and Italy 
(foremost in the renewable energy sector; Garcìa-Castrillon 2017). It seems that a few policy measures 
(or even a single one) may suddenly spark a large number of arbitration cases. Argentina faced 5 
                                                          
4 The details of the cases (claims, outcomes etc.) are reported elsewhere (see e.g., Burke-White, 2008; Martin, 
2012; Ginsburg, 2013; Lavopa, 2015; Kelly, 2018). The cases related to Argentina raise a lot of issues, just to 
mention here that the findings of arbitral tribunals have not been unanimous. (Johnson and Sachs, 2018) Two 
features are worth mentioning, which bear some relevance for other investor-state arbitration cases in different 
crisis contexts. First, Norton (2012), like many others, argues that the decision of ICSID (International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes), which determined “that its tribunals have jurisdiction over these claims 
… has created a path to increased ICSID involvement in future sovereign debt restructurings and has raised the 
question of the consequences for the current European debt crisis.” (p. 291) This is remarkable as investments 
in Argentina covered by the respective IIAs were to a large extent portfolio investment rather than FDI. Secondly 
– and closely related – it raises the issue of investor-state arbitration in mass claims under IIAs and BITs in 
particular. (Nakajima 2018)  
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arbitration cases before the 2001 crisis with the number of cases soaring to 40 in the years thereafter; 
Spain faced 2 arbitration cases until 2016 and has suddenly been confronted with 43 arbitration cases 
within two years, apparently related to a singly regulatory policy turn. 
In total, more than 950 arbitration cases are known to date. Given that even the filing of an arbitration 
claim may lead to negative reputation effects (e.g. Allee and Peinhardt, 2011; Aisbett et al. 2017; Pelc 
and Kerner 2018, Minhas and Remmer, 2018) arbitration claims could contribute to missing the stated 
policy objective of IIAs to attract investment. In addition, arbitration claims are by no means evenly 
distributed across countries. Especially countries in Latin America as well as in Central and Eastern 
Europe report claims filed against them. Therefore, an important question arises: which economic, 
political and institutional factors contribute to the perceived non-compliance of governments with the 
agreements they have concluded? 
Surprisingly few studies delve empirically into the factors that result in the development in the number 
of international arbitration disputes. And, those empirical studies that are available put a focus on the 
role of bad governance in international arbitration. We contribute to this sparse literature by analyzing 
whether economic crises increase the number of investor-state disputes -- a relationship that has been 
largely neglected so far but which finds substantial interest in qualitative analyses and in writings on 
international law. 
By conducting count data regression analysis, we establish empirically the significance of economic 
crises as determinants of arbitral disputes. We use a sample of 961 investor-state arbitration claims 
for bilateral home (75)--host (132) country pairs over the period 1986-2017. We find that episodes of 
economic crises are positively and significantly associated with the number of investor-state 
arbitration cases. We also uncover indications that the type of economic crisis has an impact on the 
strength and timing of the association between crises and claims. In addition, the positive impact of 
economic crises on arbitration cases is inversely related to the rule of law in a host country. 
We proceed as follows: In section 2 we outline the conceptual basis of the study and we derive testable 
hypotheses. In section 3 we briefly review related literature, and in section 4 we describe our empirical 
methodology as well as the variables and data used in the analysis. We discuss main results of the 
analysis in section 5 and conclude the study with section 6. 
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2. Conceptual Background and Hypotheses 
Factors affecting the prospect of compliance and non-compliance of governments to their 
commitments under international law are detailed in various strands of the literature dealing with IIA 
compliance (see Hirsh, 2009, for an overview). Basically, international legal rules alter governments’ 
interests in compliant behavior as costs and benefits of non-compliant behavior are shaped by these 
rules (Simmons, 2000; Bonnichta et al., 2017, ch. 5). 
From a rational choice perspective on international relations, national governments “calculate the 
positive and negative effects of compliance / non-compliance with a particular investment treaty and, 
consequently, adopt the strategy that best serves their interests.” (Hirsh, 2009, p. 865) This includes 
the possibility of violating an IIA and risking arbitral disputes.5 
We share Hirsh’s (2009) and Freeman’s (2013) position which says that the willingness of governments 
to violate IIAs is determined by the economic conditions that countries face. The basic argument rests 
upon the assumption that in time of crisis host governments perceive the benefits from policy 
intervention (“economic reform”) to be high and – in case these policy interventions breach an IIA – 
the arising costs to be rather low. 
Most of the literature dealing with the relationship between economic crisis and economic reform has 
long argued that economic crises trigger a number of different policy responses. For example, Nelson 
(1994) describes acute economic crises as a facilitating factor for policy action not least as a strong 
popular desire for containment of the emergency is generated. Likewise, Dupont et al. (2016) stress 
that in times of economic crisis “political, economic and social domestic actors use all available 
institutionalized channels [..] in order to push for the adoption of immediate, and sometimes radical, 
policy responses to the crisis.” (p. 143). 
Drazen (2010) summarizes basic political-economy approaches to sketch why economic crises trigger 
reforms: (i) crises draw the attention of voters and policy makers alike to the need of economic reform; 
(ii) crises also speed up the implementation of reform as they (a) may shift the power dispersion in 
the political sphere and make interest groups “more amenable to reform” (ibidem, p. 13) and (b) 
because the deterioration of the status quo makes groups more willing to accept the uncertainties 
associated with reform. 
The crisis-begets-reform literature distinguishes between macro-stabilization measures and structural 
economic reforms (stage-1 and stage-2 reforms; see Nelson, 1994 and Mahmalat and Curran, 2018). 
                                                          
5 An interesting alternative to outright violations would be to “seek to violate certain investment treaties’ 
provisions in a less transparent manner (e.g. discrimination against foreign investors) and avoid the harmful 
consequences.” (Hirsh 2009, p. 869) 
 6 
 
Policy interventions for macro-stabilization respond to macroeconomic instabilities like high inflation, 
strong devaluations of the currency or deep recessions. These stage-1 reforms include, for example, 
fiscal and monetary austerity measures, a devaluation of the currency, exchange rate and price 
controls and trade liberalizations. These types of policy interventions are administratively easy as 
transaction costs of design and implementation are low. In addition, macro-economic turbulence 
exerts its negative impact on a broad scale. This makes influential interest groups amenable to reform 
(Rodrick, 1996) and, thus, macro-stabilization will be implemented rather quickly. Stage-1 reforms are 
often implemented via emergency laws. A close link between the emergence of an economic crisis 
and the introduction of macro-stabilization policies has been established empirically (e.g., Drazen and 
Easterly, 2001; Alesina et al., 2006; Mahmalat and Curran, 2018). 
Structural economic (stage-2) reforms respond to more microeconomic challenges (Rodrik, 1996). 
They comprise inter alia financial-sector and labor-market reforms, the privatization of social security, 
health care reforms or the introduction of a revised corporate law (e.g., Nelson 1994; Mahmalat and 
Curran, 2018). Such reforms imply a change in entitlements and are subject to extensive political 
debate (Agnello et al., 2015; Lora and Olivera, 2004). Hence, adopting structural reforms is likely to 
take more time than macro-stabilization. Apart from the influence of banking and debt crisis on 
financial sector reform, the impact of economic crises on structural reform is empirically also less clear 
(e.g., Campos et al., 2010; Mahmalat and Curran, 2018).6 
All in all, the crisis-begets-reform literature suggests intensified policy interventions in the aftermath 
of an economic crisis, especially for macro-stabilization. As severe macroeconomic turmoil “hurts 
pretty much everyone” (Rodrik, 1996), the immediate benefits of governments from implementing 
reform measures are high even if these measures may violate IIAs. In addition, foreign investors could 
also become scapegoats for host governments and may be blamed to have brought on the crisis 
(Freeman, 2013). Political benefits from implementing policy measure that hurt predominantly foreign 
investors but benefit a large number of individuals should be high (Bonnitcha et al, 2017, ch. 5). 
Host countries also take the costs of breaching an IIA into consideration. These costs accrue inter alia 
in the form of reputational effects mentioned above and monetary costs (legal fees) and fines7 due to 
                                                          
6 For an interesting case study of the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2008 see Drazen (2010). 
7 Bonnitcha et al. (2017, p. 17) suggest that financial sanctions are preferred, as “an alternative default remedy 
would be restoring compliance of the host state’s laws and regulations with its international obligation, as is the 
case in the trade regime. But compelling a state to comply with investment treaty obligations is arguably a more 
intrusive remedy than ordering it to pay compensation.” Thus, the “fundamental economic argument used to 
justify compensation requirements is that government decision-makers fail to fully value (internalize) the 
economic costs of their actions that fall on investors (Bonnitcha and Aisbett 2013). 
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international arbitration. Bonnitcha et al. (2017, Tab. 1.3) report cases where arbitration tribunals 
awarded foreign investors compensations of hundreds of millions of US-Dollars. Additional costs may 
arise as well. For example, “in 2012, the U.S. suspended Argentina's preferential trade status due to 
its failure to comply with two investment arbitration awards.” (Chaisse and Donde, 2018)  
But costs of these types are highly uncertain, and they will occur only later. Therefore, the discount 
factor applied by decision makers to future costs matters.8 High discounting of future costs increases 
the willingness of governments to implement policy measures which ease severe macro-economic 
turmoil but may lead to arbitral disputes. Indeed, in times of crisis, discount factors of decision makers 
tend to be rather low. Hirsh (2009) observes that “states which encounter a major crisis (whether 
economic, security, or political) are more concerned with present exigencies and have lower discount 
rates regarding future incentives. Investment treaties are therefore more likely to be breached during 
major crisis.” (ibidem, p. 869) Likewise, Ostrom (1990) states that discount rates are affected by the 
levels of physical and economic security. In case of high uncertainty and turmoil, decision-makers tend 
to discount future returns heavily when traded off against increasing the likelihood of surviving the 
turmoil at present (ibidem, p. 35). In addition, recent experimental evidence on decision-making also 
suggests high discounting of costs. People tend to exhibit preferences biased towards the present 
(e.g., Tomer, 2017, ch. 5) and in case they are confronted with long-term challenges and opportunities 
they “systematically underweight the costs of action in favor of its desirability and thus are prone to 
wishful thinking.” (Krebs and Rapport, 2012, p. 2)  
However, it is questionable if host country decision-makers are fully aware of the consequences (ie., 
costs) of breaching an IIA. Empirical survey evidence implies rather low levels of awareness regarding 
the content of IIAs as well as the risk of arbitration claims by foreign investors (Bonnitcha et al., 2017, 
ch. 6; Jandhyala et al. 2011; van Harten 2010). Put differently, host government officials may not fully 
understand the extent of potential costs of breaching an IIA. This implies that even in case decision-
makers had high discount factors, they will not give up present benefits to achieve an end to which 
they assign little value (Krebs and Rapport, 2012).9 From this reasoning we conclude that governments 
perceive the present value of costs from breaching IIAs as low. 
                                                          
8 The discount factor measures how much weight a decision-maker attaches to future income / cost streams. It 
captures the general tendency toward impatience (e.g., Krebs and Rapport, 2012). 
9 Furthermore, a government’s time-horizon may be too short to fully internalize future costs arising from 
breaching an IIA. For instance, Blake (2013) stresses “[i]f a government anticipates losing power in the near 
future with little prospect of returning to power, its time horizon will necessarily be short. In such cases, a 
government will be less concerned about having to confront changing circumstances. Any political and economic 
costs that are incurred in the future when institutional commitments limit policy responses to changing 
conditions will be paid by future governments.” (ibidem, p. 806) 
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All things considered, from a benefit-costs perspective the willingness of host governments to 
implement policy measures which may breach IIAs is high in times of economic crisis. This view is 
consistent with Ballan (2018), who stresses that in times of economic crises “a state’s regulatory 
agencies are expected to pursue immediate and effective measures in order to minimize the scope of 
the economic crisis and its costs. Yet, nationalizing a bank or revising a contract in vital sectors may 
contradict international obligations arising from investment agreements.” (p. 4) It is also consistent 
with the findings of Islam (2018, Ch. 6.3.), who reports and describes a number of arbitral awards 
where the investment disputes arose as a consequence of a host country’s actions to address an 
economic crisis.10 
It is important to note that economic reform measures, especially of the macro-stabilization type, tend 
to be broad-based, covering many economic sectors and companies.11 This gives rise to the possibility 
of a large number of foreign investors being affected by these measures – and hence potentially a 
large number of similar arbitration cases in case of violations of IIAs. Against this background we state 
our first hypothesis tested in the empirical section of the paper as follows:  
 
H1: Episodes of economic crises are positively and significantly associated with the number of investor-
state arbitration cases a host country faces.  
 
This realist perspective on international relations (Hirsh, 2009) discusses compliance / non-compliance 
with IIAs solely from the viewpoint of governments as defendants in international arbitration disputes. 
However, it is also crucial to consider the willingness of foreign investors (claimants) to bring an 
arbitration case to court. As argued – and shown empirically – by Freeman (2013), a host country’s 
institutional capacity for protecting property rights is of crucial importance in this respect.  
As Freeman (2013) notes, foreign investors see international arbitration as a last resort. International 
arbitration is not only costly, it is also capable of destroying a firm’s relationship with the host 
government. Investors often try ”to resolve disputes with host governments without having to resort 
to arbitration if possible.” (ibidem, p. 58) 
Domestic institutions are a potential alternative to international arbitration. Perceiving the decisions 
of domestic courts as impartial, transparent and fair is a necessary condition for foreign investors to 
                                                          
10 Scherer (2010, p. 220ff) includes a list of individual cases thought to be crisis-related.  
11 Among the policy measures taken are controls of capital outflows, nationalizations of firms or changes in 
ordered utility rates (also see section 4.2b). 
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opt for the domestic route of dispute settlement. . Put differently, the rule of law in a host country 
has an impact on in using international arbitration. In countries with a strong rule of law, foreign 
investors will be less inclined to revert to international arbitration to protect their property rights. 
The rule of law not only determines the willingness of foreign investors to use international 
arbitration. According to the liberal approach to international relations (Hirsh, 2009), it also shapes 
the opportunity of host countries to violate international law (Freeman, 2013). In an environment of 
a strong rule of law, independent domestic institutions (including courts) are more likely to protect 
investors’ contractual and property rights, because these institutions set constraints for host 
government conduct (Hirsh, 2009).  
From both, the foreign firm and the host government perspective, the rule of law in a country should 
per se be negatively associated with international arbitration cases. We hypothesize that increasing 
strengths of a country’s rule of law also moderate the positive impact of economic crises on 
international arbitration for two reasons: First, in case of a strong rule of law foreign investors may 
opt for the domestic route of dispute settlement. Yet, there are two important limitations to this 
argument, hence its validity remains ultimately an empirical question: (i) it may occur that not all 
issues arising between a host country and a foreign investor can be taken to domestic courts, simply 
because they are not regulated in the domestic law of the host country; and (ii) an investor facing the 
choice between an IIA and the domestic route will opt for the former in case the perceived probability 
of winning a case is higher, for example because of the large room of interpretation of some BIT 
clauses. Second, in case of a strong rule of law host governments have less space to breach IIAs even 
in times of crisis. From this reasoning we derive our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: The positive impact of economic crises on arbitration cases is inversely related to the rule of law in 
a host country: The stronger the rule of law in a host country, the lower the impact of economic crises. 
 
3. Review of Related Empirical Literature 
According to Freeman (2013), a combination of opportunity, defined as those factors that make 
investor-state arbitrations possible, and willingness, defined as the willingness to violate an IIA and to 
file a case at an international tribunal, respectively, lead to four broad types of causal factors that 
should explain the occurrence of investment treaty arbitration (ibidem, p. 59): 
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1. The host country’s exposure to treaty-based arbitral claims (opportunity) 
2. The incentives of foreign investors to pursue arbitral claims (willingness) 
3. The incentives of host states to engage in disputable behavior (willingness) 
4. Constraints on host state behavior (opportunity). 
 
We hypothesize that economic crises increase the willingness of governments to engage in disputable 
behavior and thus, economic crises are subsumed in category 3. Despite the large number of individual 
investor- state arbitration cases which are thought to be directly or indirectly connected to economic 
or political crises, quantitative empirical studies on determinants of investor-state arbitration claims 
do not, with one exception (i.e., Dupont et al., 2016), focus on economic crises as drivers of investor-
state arbitration claims.12  
Rather, quantitative empirical studies mainly investigate the importance of the level of 
democratization and the strengths of the rule of law as drivers of international arbitration cases. 
According to Freeman (2013) the institutional capacity of a host country determines “how disputes 
between foreign investors and states arise in the first place and how such disputes subsequently get 
transformed into arbitral disputes.” (ibidem, p. 58) Institutional capacity shapes both, the opportunity 
of governments to engage in disputable behavior and the willingness of firms to bring a claim to an 
arbitration claim court. 
Several studies do indeed find strong evidence for a negative association between the number of 
arbitral claims and a host country’s institutional capacity, measured via the strengths of the rule of 
law, the extent of corruption or the degree of property rights protection (e.g., Freeman, 2013; Dupont 
et al., 2015; Dupont et al., 2016). Williams (2015) and Williams (2018) isolate a positive correlation 
between the number of arbitral disputes and the level of democratization of a host country.13 Williams 
                                                          
12 However, some studies include variables capturing the state of the economy in the set of control variables 
(see below). 
13 Li (2016) also explains arbitral disputes inter alia with the level of democratization among the set of 
independent variables. Li (2016) uses this regression as an intermediate step in forecasting overall expected cost 
of compensation payments. The author is only interested in coefficient stability rather than isolating robust 
associations between variables (Li, 2016, p. 81). Simmons (2014) inter alia also empirically investigates 
arbitrations claims. She uses a dynamic random effects approach to model associations of the log of arbitrations 
as dependent variable and inter alia the log of GDP growth as an indicator for the business cycle. Using the log 
of arbitrations drops zero observations (and is likely to introduce sample selection issues) and using the log of 
GDP growth eliminates negative growth rates in GDP from the estimations. Apart from the cumulative number 
of BITs signed, Simmons (2014) does not include any institutional or political variables in her model. In addition, 
the random effects estimator does not lead to consistent estimates in dynamic models. Berge (2018) focuses on 
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(2015, 2018) explains the positive correlation with more democratic governments being motivated by 
“ideological concerns or pressure from key constituencies in their dealing with foreign investors.” 
(2015, p. 209) This means that democratic institutions, domestic audiences like interest groups or 
voters “put pressure on policy-makers to take actions which harm investors’ interests, and which in 
turn may trigger an investment arbitration.” (2018, p. 15) By postulating a non-linear relationship, Kim 
(2017) sheds new light on the association between the number of arbitral disputes and the level of 
democratization. Kim (2017) finds that host governments’ risk of facing international arbitration 
claims is highest at intermediate levels of democracy. He argues that this is the case due to a 
combination of relatively high regulatory risk and a relatively weak rule of law at intermediate levels 
of democratization when compared to autocracies as well as full democracies. 
Dupont et al. (2016) is the only study that explicitly aims to isolate the role of economic crises for the 
number of international arbitration claims. These authors interpret economic crises as one of two 
manifestations of political risk. The second type of political risk materializes in form of a weak rule of 
law. They apply ordered logit and negative binomial estimators and show results with 
contemporaneous and lagged GDP growth as indicator for economic crisis. From their analysis Dupont 
et al. (2016) conclude that while bad governance (weak rule of law, high levels of corruption) shows a 
statistically significant association with investment arbitration disputes, economic crises do not. 
However, Dupont et al. (2016) also put a question mark to their finding concerning the role of 
economic crises by stating that “the choice of GDP growth as indicator of possible severe economic 
conditions is clearly overly simplistic”. (p. 151) 
A few further papers include macroeconomic conditions among their set of control variables. Freeman 
(2013) argues that a slumping domestic economy might increase the risk of noncompliant behavior 
on the part of the host government by shortening its time horizon. He uses two crisis indicators: (i) 
growth in GDP and (ii) a dummy variable indicating that a country abandons a fixed exchange-rate 
regime due to a currency crisis. The latter variable aims to control for the situation in Argentina in 
2002. For neither variable Freeman (2013) is able to isolate a statistically significant association with 
the number of arbitral disputes a country faces. 
Williams (2015) includes the log of inflation rate in her regressions and reports a positive association 
of this variable with the number of arbitration cases. Yayi (2017) focusses on the impact of common 
historical ties on arbitral disputes for which he finds strong evidence of a positive association. He also 
                                                          
the legal content of IIAs and investor claims for arbitration. The study is not concerned with economic or political 
crises as a driver of investor-state arbitration. For these reasons we do not include these studies in our review. 
 12 
 
includes growth in GDP among explanatory variables and concludes that this variable is not 
consistently significant across the empirical specifications he estimates.  
Taking everything into account, the existing empirical literature is consistent with the view that 
investor-state arbitration claims are predominantly a phenomenon in countries with bad governance, 
in particular a weak rule of law. Economic crises do not play a major role, neither in the conceptual 
set-up of related studies nor in their statistical analyses. This neglect of a link between economic crises 
and investor-state arbitration claims is unexpected in the light of case studies for individual countries 
(see, e.g., Islam, 2018, ch. 6.3) and existing systematic qualitative analyses by scholars in international 
law (e.g., van Aaken and Kurtz, 2009).  
The established irrelevance of economic crises for investor-state arbitration claims may inter alia rest 
on the lack of meaningful operationalizations of economic crises episodes in prior studies (i.e., growth 
in GDP and log of inflation rate). The crisis-begets-reform literature stresses how important it is to use 
indicators which are capable of clearly pinpointing severe macro-economic turmoil (i.e., economic 
crisis). From this literature we also know about the difficulty to isolate clear episodes of economic 
crisis, not least due to the fact that what constitutes a crisis in one country may constitute normal 
circumstances in other countries (e.g., Mahmalat and Curran, 2018). We agree with Dupont et al. 
(2016) that the measures used in the surveyed papers are overly simplistic. Therefore, one addition 
of our research consists in analyzing the links between the occurrence of economic crises and the 
emergence of investor-state arbitration claims using (various) appropriate measures for severe macro-
economic turmoil.  
 
4. Empirical Methodology , Variables and Data 
 
4.1. Empirical Methodology 
 
Arbitration cases are dyadic in nature. This opens the possibility to model statistical associations over 
a variety of dimensions. We assume that the number (counts) of arbitration cases a country-dyad 
records in a particular year, 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡, follows a conditional Poisson distribution with expectation given 
in equation 1 (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2010, ch. 18): 
 
𝐸 [
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
∝𝑖𝑗,   𝜗𝑡,  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡,   𝑍𝑖𝑡,  𝑊𝑗𝑡 
] = exp (𝛾𝑖𝑗  + 𝜗𝑡  +  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽1  +  𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2  + 𝑊𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽3)   (1) 
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where i = host (defendant) country, j = home country (of claimant firm), ij = country-dyad; t = year 
(1996, …2017)14; 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = (0, 1,…..9); 𝛾𝑖𝑗  and 𝜗𝑡 are dyad- and year-fixed effects. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ , 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′  and 𝑊𝑗𝑡
′  
include variables that are associated with 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 and that vary across time and country-dyads (ijt), 
across time and host countries (it) and time and home countries (jt), respectively. 
Using dyad-fixed effects implies that we control for time invariant dyad-specific variables. We believe 
that controlling for such unmeasured factors is important for our application. From the constructive 
approach to international relations (Hirsh, 2009) we infer that host country i and home country j may 
share social values including the perception of what represents a breach of an IIA, which, in turn, may 
determine the willingness to sue a host country. In addition, historical ties and common cultural traits 
may make it easier to find alternative modes of dispute settlement (like diplomatic intervention by 
home governments). From the gravity-based literature on the determinants of FDI we know that the 
distance between host and home country matters. The geographically closer two countries i and j are, 
the more important is FDI of country j for host country i and the more important is host country i for 
investors from home country j. Geographical closeness may determine the willingness to breach an 
IIA with country j (reputational effect) and also the willingness to sue host country i in case of a breach 
(longer-lasting interest in country i as a host country). Common historical ties, a common official 
language and geographical closeness should also be paired with increased knowledge about a host 
country’s quality of property rights protection. Factors like these are inter alia captured by country-
dyad fixed effects. Dyadic-fixed effects capture the impact of NAFTA-membership on arbitral disputes. 
This is important given that there is a substantial number of arbitral claims between NAFTA members 
(also see Williams, 2018). 
Country-dyad fixed effects also absorb host- and home-country fixed effects. We therefore implicitly 
control for the political regime in a country or the position of a country in the world economy and in 
world politics, as long as these factors are stable over time. Controlling for such factors is important, 
as more democratic regimes - ceteris paribus - are more inclined to comply with IIAs (liberal approach 
to international relations; Hirsh, 2009) and as the costs arising from retaliation measures of home 
countries of investors depend on the position of the home / host country in the global economy. 
Home-country fixed effects also capture the fact that some home countries may structurally provide 
investors with “a particular broad set of options available to address a concern with foreign 
governments […].” (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 149). 
                                                          
14 Data on arbitration cases start in 1987. However, due to missing data on key explanatory variables we use 
arbitration cases from 1996 only. We lose 12 arbitral disputes. 
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The fixed-effects Poisson estimator is robust to a variety of misspecifications like deviations from the 
Poisson distribution or time dependence between 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡−𝑘, but a fully robust variance-
covariance estimator is required in such instances (Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 763). However, the fixed-
effects Poisson estimator neglects information contained in country-dyads, which never record an 
arbitration case (“pacific dyads”). As Beck and Katz (2001) note, this implies that pacific dyads lack 
arbitration cases because of some unmodeled idiosyncratic features of these dyads. Put differently, 
variables contained in 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ , 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′  and 𝑊𝑗𝑡
′  are irrelevant for explaining the absence of arbitration cases 
in pacific dyads. 
To deal with this issue, we present regression results based on the entire sample in a sensitivity-
analysis (i.e., by excluding dyad-fixed effects from equation 1). The entire sample includes many 
country-dyads which never record an arbitral dispute. For such situations the Zero-Inflated Negative 
Binominal estimator (ZINB) makes substantive sense (e.g., Long, 1997). The ZINB estimator copes with 
zeros-inflation by assuming that zero counts arise in two ways (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 681): 
(1) as a realization of a binary process (e.g., Logit) which models that a country-dyad never records an 
arbitration case and (2) as a realization of a count process (i.e., Negative Binomial) given that a 
country-dyad experiences at least one arbitration case over the sample period.  
We assume that the ZINB model has the following conditional expectation (see, Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009, p. 587): 
 
𝐸 [
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
∝𝑖𝑗,   𝜗𝑡,  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡,  𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡   𝑍𝑖𝑡,  𝑊𝑗𝑡 
] = {1 − 𝐺1(
0
𝜗𝑡,  𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
)} exp (𝜗𝑡  +  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽1  +  𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2  + 𝑊𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽3) (2) 
 
where {1 − 𝐺1(
0
𝜗𝑡,    𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
)} is the probability that the Logit process variable equals 1 (i.e., probability of 
never recording an arbitration case). In our application of the ZINB estimator the Negative Binomial 
process includes the independent variables also contained in equation 1. Dyad-fixed effects are 
substituted by ten regional dummy variables for host countries (included in 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ ) as well as bilaterally 
defined variables capturing the bilateral distance between capital cities and variables indicating the 
presence of a common official language in i and j and common historical ties of i and j (included in 
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ ).  
The Logit process includes time-fixed effects and a dummy variable signaling that a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡) is in force in year t. Freeman (2013) stresses that 𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a natural 
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candidate for modelling the probability of never experiencing an arbitral dispute. Without a BIT in 
force, the opportunities for foreign investors to file arbitral claims against a host country are 
diminished. BITs are the prime vehicle of foreign investors to sue host countries. In the Logit process 
we also include  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,   and its square  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
2 , which capture the years between arbitration cases. 
This is done to deal with the possibility of time dependence in the binary process (see Beck et al, 1998; 
Carter and Signorino, 2010). 
To test hypothesis H2 we add an interaction term between our proxy variables for economic crisis and 
the rule of law in a host country to equation (1).  
 
𝐸 [
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
∝𝑖𝑗 ,   𝜗𝑡,   𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,   𝑍𝑖𝑡,  𝑊𝑗𝑡  
] = 
exp (𝛾𝑖𝑗  +  𝜗𝑡  + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽1  +  𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2  +  𝑊𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽3  +  𝛽4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡) (3) 
 
As a continuous (Rule of Law) and a binary variable (Economic Crisis) are interacted, the coefficient on 
the interaction term, 𝛽4, can be directly interpreted as interaction effect (Shang et al., 2018).
15 The 
influential work of Brambor et al. (2006) suggests that it is advisable to calculate and graphically 
visualize the impact of economic crisis on the endogenous variable at various values of the interacting 
variable. This might reveal interesting non-linearities in the economic crisis effect even in case the 
interaction term per se is statistically insignificant.  
 
4.2. Variables and Data 
 
a) Arbitration Cases 
Data on arbitration cases16 are drawn from two sources. Data until 2014 are compiled by Wellhausen 
(2016). We add data for the years 2015 – 2017 using UNCTAD’s Investment Arbitration database. In 
                                                          
15 This is not only a marked contrast to Logit or Probit estimators, but also to Poisson regressions where two 
binary variables are interacted. (See Greene, 2010 and Shang et al., 2018, for a discussion.) 
16 It should be noted that a considerable share of BITs include “umbrella” clauses, which extend the protection 
provided in BITs beyond investments to investor-state contracts. In line with other empirical studies, this 
suggests inclusion of investor-state arbitration cases arising from investor – state contracts in addition to cases 
based on FDI. 
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addition, we include all those cases up to 2014, which the latter database includes but which are not 
contained in Wellhausen (2016).  
Figure 1 shows that treaty-based arbitration cases start to emerge in 1987. Around 1996, a steep and 
lasting surge sets in and they become a phenomenon host countries have to reckon with. The surge 
in arbitration cases happened with a time lag after the increase in BITs signed and put in force from 
the 1990s onwards (see, e.g., UNCTAD, 2018b, Fig. III.3. and Fig. III.4). 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Tables A1 and A2 detail the distribution of arbitration cases over host and home countries.17 The tables 
imply that 961 investor-state arbitration cases from 75 home (claimant) and 132 host (defendant) 
countries over the 1987 to 2017 period are available. In some years a host country may face more 
than one arbitral complaint from one particular home country. Thus, the number of instances with at 
least one arbitration case in a country-dyad and year is lower than 961. The corresponding number is 
815. 
Table A1 signals that individual countries in South- and Latin America are frequently targets of arbitral 
claims, with Argentina facing the most arbitral disputes followed by Venezuela. Figure 2 shows that 
the region with the most arbitral disputes (312) is that of Eastern Europe & post-Soviet Union followed 
by Latin America (254). Western European & North American countries are confronted with 112 
disputes in total.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
                                                          
17 Note that these numbers are slightly different from those available on UNCTAD’s homepage. According to 
UNCTAD (UNCTAD 2018a), UNCTAD compiles this information on the basis of public sources. UNCTAD’s statistics 
do not cover investor-state cases that are based exclusively on investment contracts, national investment law 
or cases in which a party has signaled its intention to submit a claim to ISDS but has not commenced the 
arbitration. Annual and cumulative case numbers are continuously adjusted as a result of verification and may 
not match case numbers reported in previous years. We use information from UNCTAD’s homepage available in 
April 2018. 
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The most important home countries of claimants are the United States of America and the 
Netherlands (cf. Table A2).18 As Figure 3 details, the vast majority of arbitral disputes are filed by 
foreign investors from Western European and North American countries (752). 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
b) Economic Crisis Variables 
Several different - but often interrelated - types of economic crises have been described in the 
literature (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, ch. 1; Claessens and Kose, 2014). Soaring rates of inflation, 
heavily depreciating currencies and negative growth rates in real GDP are common indicators signaling 
severe macro-economic turmoil (i.e., economic crisis). Governments react to such events in a variety 
of ways like price freezes, the nationalization and operational restructuring of companies, granting 
financial support to (domestic) companies, introduction of controls on capital outflows or changing 
ordered public utility rates (e.g., Edison and Reinhart, 2000; IMF, 2003; Claessens et al, 2014; Dupont 
et al, 2016; Islam, 2018, ch. 6.3). As outlined in section 2, we claim that macro-stabilization policy 
interventions of these types, in turn, are the basis of international arbitration disputes. 
Most studies testing the crisis-begets-reform hypothesis inter alia use inflation-, currency- or real 
economic growth-based indicators of economic crisis (e.g., Drazen and Easterly, 2001; Pitlik and Wirth, 
2003; Agnello et al., 2015; and Mahmalat and Curran, 2018 for a synthesis) and hence these are also 
applied in the present study. Thereby, we separate inflation rate-, exchange rate- and real economic 
growth rate-based indicators of economic crises into two broad categories (see, Mahmalat and 
Curran, 2018 for a discussion): 
 
(i) “Conventional” crisis measures which are derived based on deviations from threshold 
values of the underlying macroeconomic variables, and 
(ii) “Relative” crisis measures which, to a certain extent, take recent changes in the macro-
economic environment in a host country into account. Relative measures aim to cope with 
the possibility that reaching a specific threshold value might imply severe turmoil in 
countries that are used to solid macro-economic conditions. However, for countries with 
                                                          
18 As home countries, Belgium and Luxembourg are merged into “BELLUX” as they share the same Bilateral 
Investment Treaties.  
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traditionally weak macro-economic performance, jumping the threshold value in year t 
might not be an appropriate barometer for the occurrence of an economic crisis.19 
 
We define conventional crisis indicators as follows: 
 
1. C_Inflation_Rate_Crisis_(it) = 1 if the inflation rate for country i in year t is > 20 percent (see, 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, ch. 1; Agnello et al., 2015) and 0 otherwise. 
2. C_Exchange_Rate_Crisis_(it) = 1 if in year t a host country’s currency depreciates by on 
average by more than 15 percent against the US-Dollar (see, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, ch. 1; 
Agnello et al., 2015) and 0 otherwise;20 
3. C_Economic_Growth_Crisis_(it) = 1 if the growth rate of real GDP for country i in year t is < 0 
and 0 otherwise (see, e.g., Bjørnskov, 2016). 
 
The relative economic crisis measures applied in this paper consider whether a host country’s macro-
economic situation changes substantially compared to the prior year. We use the following 
operationalizations of episodes of relative economic crises: 
 
4. R_Inflation_Rate_Crisis_(it) = 1 if the inflation rate for country i in year t is > 20 percent and 
the change in the inflation rate from t-1 to t is > 100 percent (see, Mahmalat and Curran, 2018 
for a similar operationalization used by Tornell, 1998); 
5. R_Exchange_Rate_Crisis_(it) =1 if in year t a host country’s currency depreciates by on average 
by more than 15 percent against the US-Dollar and the change in the growth rate of the 
exchange rate from t-1 to t is > 100 percent; 
6. R_Economic_Growth_Crisis_(it) = 1 (i) if the growth rate of real GDP for country i in year t is < 
0 after at least two consecutive years of positive economic growth rates (see Bjørnskov, 2016); 
in addition, this variable has entry 1 (ii) if real economic growth is already negative in t-1 but 
the drop in the economic growth rate from t-1 to t is > 100 percent.21 
 
                                                          
19 Put differently, while a crisis might be perceived as severe in one country, it might represent normality in 
another country. Relative crises indicators aim to cope with this aspect. 
20 To avoid losing the USA, Exchange_Rate_Crisis_(it) variables are evaluated against the Euro for the USA. 
21 For instance, if real economic growth is -1 percent in t-1 but it is -5 percent in t, then considering only part (i) 
of the R_Economic_Growth_Crisis_(it) definition would lead to entry 0 for t; however, by also considering part 
(ii) we assign entry 1 to R_Economic_Growth_Crisis_(it). A substantial further drop of a negative economic 
growth rate is thus considered as episode of economic crisis. 
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Relative crisis definitions are even stricter than those of conventional measures. We, thus, see fewer 
episodes of economic crisis when using relative crisis measures (cf. Table 1).22 
In addition to these three measures we use an indicator for the occurrence of sovereign debt crises in 
the analysis. This is justified for a number of reasons:  
(i) Sovereign debt default often signals deeper macro-economic problems, like a sustained 
lack of economic activity, which leads inter alia to low tax revenues. For example, Neri 
and Ropele (2015) conclude that the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008 “made credit 
conditions significantly worse and weighed on economic activity and unemployment.” (p. 
4) This is explained by the deterioration in sovereign creditworthiness, which makes bank 
funding costlier and more difficult to obtain as problems in financial institutions disrupt 
credit allocation, worsen capital flight and deepen the crisis (IMF 2003).  
(ii) Sovereign debt-crises often lead to large capital outflows (i.e., capital flight of domestic 
and foreign investors) and to the implementation of capital outflow controls (e.g., IMF, 
2003) from which investor-state arbitration cases may emerge. More generally, like in 
case of the inflation, currency and real economic growth crises policy measures carried 
out in the wake of sovereign debt crises have a high probability to violate rights of foreign 
direct investors. For example, Waibel (2007) lists six justifications why debt restructuring 
violates the fair and equitable treatment standard (FET) in BITs – together with a number 
of other absolute standards like indirect expropriation or free capital transfer. 
(iii) Besides foreign direct investors, in view of sovereign debt crises being an indicator of 
structural problems of a country’s financial markets23, some policy interventions in the 
aftermath of a sovereign debt default may ultimately hit foreign portfolio investors as 
well. Indeed, investor-state arbitration cases exist where an ICSID arbitration tribunal 
declared its jurisdiction concerning financial asset holders’ mass claims. Moreover, a 
legitimate and reasonable argument has been put forward concerning the possibility that 
the next major sovereign debt crisis may result in many more states facing claims under 
their investment arbitration regime (Hopwood, 2018, p. 61). A large literature has evolved 
around the issue of investor- state arbitration where the investors are organized by 
vulture funds (e.g. Waibel 2007; Kelly 2018; Megliani 2018 with reference to highly 
indebted poor countries; Boggio 2018). 
                                                          
22 For instance, if in year t the inflation rate is > 20 percent in country i, but it is similar in t-1, 
C_Inflation_Rate_Crisis_(it) has entry 1 but R_Inflation_Rate_Crisis_(it) has entry 0. 
23 Indeed, systemic banking crises frequently coincide with or precede sovereign debt crises (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2018). 
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(iv) The timing of debt default and restructuring can be exactly determined and thus there is 
no ambiguity concerning the start of a sovereign debt default and the date of debt 
restructuring. This is an advantage over the purely data-driven definitions of economic 
crises.24 
 
In conclusion, sovereign debt defaults and debt restructuring measures may trigger investor-state 
arbitration cases in the “traditional form” of claims by foreign firms but also increasingly a “new type” 
of arbitration driven by portfolio investors. It is therefore important to include this type of economic 
crisis in an analysis of investor-state arbitration. 
Sovereign debt crises (Sov_Debt_Crisis_(it)) are operationalized by combining the information 
provided in Laeven and Valencia (2012 and 2018) on the year of sovereign default and on the year of 
sovereign debt restructuring. Sov_Debt_Crisis_(it)) has entry 1 if the government defaults on its 
outstanding debt obligations in a given year t or if it restructures the outstanding debt in year t (or 
both).  
Compared to the other types of economic crises considered, sovereign debt crises are rather 
infrequent (cf. Table 1). This infrequency of sovereign debt default and debt restructuring makes 
Sov_Debt_Crisis_(it) akin to the relative crisis measures defined above. Sov_Debt_Crisis_(it) isolates 
single years of crisis after many years of no debt default or restructuring. Put differently, entry 1 of 
Sov_Debt_Crisis_(it) implies a considerable deterioration in the macro-economic situation in a country 
when evaluated against this country’s own macro-economic past. As a relatively rare event, it makes 
our approach “conservative” in the sense that in case we determine an association with arbitration 
claims this strengthens our argument that economic crises and claims are related. 
Finally, we also derive an “overall crises indicator” based on empirical results for individual crisis 
indicators. Specifically, we first determine whether the conventional or the relative measure for the 
same type of crisis leads to a lower value of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).25 Then, we 
construct Overall_Crisis_(it) which has entry 1 whenever at least one of the four crisis measures (either 
the conventional or the relative economic growth, inflation or exchange rate-based measure 
depending on AIC and the measure for sovereign debt crisis) has entry 1 in a specific year. 
                                                          
24 See Bjørnskov (2016) on data-related problems in isolating real economic growth crisis especially in less 
developed countries. 
25 AIC can be used to compare non-nested models based on a same estimation sample (same number of 
observations). 
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[Table 1 here] 
 
We include the various economic crisis indicators with a one-year (t-1) and a two-year (t-2) lag in our 
empirical models. Firstly, this reflects the fact that it takes some time for foreign investors to file a 
claim (e.g., Williams, 2015). Secondly, it signifies that in order to cope with macro-economic turmoil, 
governments might need some time to implement policy measures which, in turn, are the basis for 
arbitration claims of foreign firms.26 
 
c) Control Variables 
Besides the various indicators of economic crises and dyad- and year-fixed effects we employ a rich 
set of control variables. These control variables capture both the willingness and the opportunity of 
host governments to implement disputable policy measures and of foreign firms to bring arbitral 
claims before an arbitration council. Table 2, which is based on Freeman (2013), provides an overview. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
i. Variables in 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕
′  
 
The main variable contained in 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′  is 𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡, which signals that a Bilateral Investment Treaty is in force 
in year t. This variable determines the opportunity of foreign investors to bring an arbitration before 
an arbitration council.27 
In ZINB regressions, which do not include dyad-fixed effects, we use the bilateral distance between 
capital cities (Log_Distance_Capital_Cities_(ijt)) instead, a common official language dummy variable 
(Common_Language_(ijt)), and a dummy variable indicating a prior colonial relationship between i 
and j (Colonial_Relationship_(ijt)). As noted above, we include 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
2  in the Logit part 
of the ZINB regressions. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 has entry zero in the year after an instance of arbitration is recorded 
and it increases linearly until the next instance arises in a country-dyad. 
                                                          
26 As outlined in section 2, compared to macro-stabilization measures, structural reform measures undergo a 
more involved decision-making process. Arbitration cases based on the former type of crisis measures may arise 
relatively soon after a crisis, while arbitration cases in response to the latter may arise with greater time lag.  
27 We admit that BITs per se may have different legal content along several dimensions (e.g., Berge, 2018). 
However, due to the Most Favored Nation clause more favorable provisions from other IIAs can be “imported” 
to any BIT. Thus, a fine-grained disaggregation of BITs along legal dimensions is not of predominant importance 
for our application, while the inclusion of 𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡  is. 
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ii. Variables in 𝒁𝒊𝒕
′  
 
Domestic institutions provide alternative avenues for foreign investors to enforce their property 
rights. We use the rule of law indicator (Rule_of_Law_(it)) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2011) to 
capture the quality of domestic institutions. In addition, we add a variable that signifies the quality of 
regulation (Quality_of_Regulation_(it)) advanced by the same authors. This variable measures the 
incidence of market-unfriendly policies and inadequate bank supervision as well as perceptions of the 
burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development 
(Teorell et al., 2017). As Quality_of_Regulation_(it) is highly correlated with Rule_of_Law_(it), we use 
the residuals from a regression of Quality_of_Regulation_(it) on Rule_of_Law_(it) and, thus, use the 
part of quality of regulation which is unrelated to the rule of law in our analysis (see, Bénassy-Quéré 
et al., 2007).  
Higher values of Rule_of_Law_(it) and of Quality_of_Regulation_(it) indicate better domestic 
institutions. We expect a negative association of these variables with the number of arbitral disputes. 
A weak rule of law is paired with both, opportunities for disputable behavior of governments as well 
as the willingness of foreign investors to sue host governments (see Freeman, 2013). As the quality of 
regulation, which is measured by the Kaufmann et al. (2011) index, points out the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies, lower values of Quality_of_Regulation_(it) should also be associated with a higher 
willingness of firms to bring cases to tribunals (also see Dupont et al., 2016).  
We also include a measure of GDP per capita (Log_GDP_per_Capita_(it)) to estimate the quality of 
domestic institutions in a country. We expect low economic development to be related to higher 
opportunities for disputable behavior of governments. 
The link between economic crises and arbitration cases is based on the assumption that in the wake 
of an economic crisis host governments implement policy measures which breach stipulations in IIAs. 
The possibilities of policy change, however, depend on the political constraints decision-makers face. 
Governments facing greater political constraints are less likely to implement policy measures that 
trigger arbitral disputes (Williams, 2015 and 2018). We use the Polcon3 index (Henisz, 2002) to capture 
veto points and the (in)feasibility of policy change (Infeasibilty_Policy_Change_(it)). Higher values of 
Polcon3 indicate more veto points. We expect a negative association of 
Infeasibilty_Policy_Change_(it) with the number of arbitration cases. 
On the one hand, having conducted Foreign Direct Investment in a host country (Log_FDI_Stock_(it)) 
usually forms the basis for foreign investors to file arbitration claims. Hence, the more FDI a country 
hosts, the larger is the potential for arbitral claims (Freeman, 2013). On the other hand, a large stock 
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of FDI may imply that a host country heavily relies on this source of capital. In turn, the willingness of 
a government to breach an IIA may be low (e.g., Williams, 2015). Therefore, the sign of 
Log_FDI_Stock_(it) is ambiguous a priori.  
Besides BITs, foreign investors frequently invoke the Energy Treaty Charter as the basis for their 
arbitral claims. This requires that a country has signed and put in force this treaty. 
Energy_Charter_Treaty_ (it), a binary variable with entry 1 in case a country is a member of the treaty, 
aims to model this possibility. We expect this variable to have a positive association with arbitral 
claims. 
Arbitral claims may also arise in the wake of wars, armed conflicts and changes in the political regime. 
These events may lead to a policy change which, in turn, may trigger arbitral disputes (e.g., Campos 
et al, 2010; Bonnichta et al, 2017, ch. 1). We model such instances of “political crises” using three 
binary variables: One indicates episodes of wars (War_it)) and another signifies years with minor 
armed conflicts (Minor_Armed_Conflicts (it)). Episodes of war are defined as years with at least 1000 
battle-related deaths. Years with minor conflicts see between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths (Eck 
and Pettersson, 2018). The third political crisis-related variable indicates years with a change in the 
political regime (Regime_Change_(it)). As noted by Dupont et al. (2016), regime changes may put 
foreign investors at risk of expropriation. Regime_Change_(it) has entry 1 in the first year in which a 
new regime is established (Marshall et al., 2017). 
In ZINB regressions we include ten regional dummy variables for host countries. The definition of 
regions is the one developed by Wahman et al. (2013). 
 
iii. Variables in 𝑾𝒋𝒕
′  
 
Cumulated_Cases_Home_(jt) counts the cumulated number of arbitration cases which emerge from 
a particular home country. It aims to capture the awareness of foreign investors from a particular 
home country of the possibility to bring a case against a particular host country before an arbitration 
council.28 
Tables A3 and A4 include descriptive statistics and pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables 
used in the empirical analysis. Table A5 details data sources. 
 
                                                          
28 The increasing awareness of foreign investors of the possibility of arbitration claims is, to a certain extent, also 
captured by year-fixed effects. These effects inter alia capture the time trend in arbitral disputes. 
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5. Regression Results 
Poisson estimates are easy to interpret. In case the variables are used in logarithmic form (i.e., 
Log_GDP_per_Capita (it) and Log_FDI_Stock (it)), Poisson coefficients directly represent elasticities. 
Remaining coefficients can, with slight modifications, be interpreted as semi-elasticities. For this aim 
coefficients of continuous variables need to be multiplied by 100. Coefficients of discrete variables, 
including the economic crises variables used, need to be transformed by 100(exp(coefficient)-1) in 
order to derive semi-elasticities. 
 
5.1 The role of economic crises 
 
a) Do economic crises matter for the number of arbitration cases? 
Table 3 includes results using the various crises definitions provided in section 4. Columns (1) to (3) 
are based on conventional and Columns (4) – (6) on relative crisis indicators. Column (7) shows findings 
for Sov_Debt_Crisis (it).  
Table 3 demonstrates that episodes of economic crises are positively and significantly associated with 
the number of investor-state arbitration cases. Hence, this evidence supports our first hypothesis, and 
it is consistent with the view that governments are inclined to violate their international commitments 
enshrined in IIAs (which affects a few foreign investors) in favor of interventions to mitigate the 
consequences of crises (which affect the whole economy). 
A comparison of conventional versus relative crisis measures reveals some differences as to the signs 
and significance of the results. Coefficients are somewhat larger for relative crisis measures. However, 
Economic_Growth_Crisis_(it) is only significant in its conventional form. To arrive at preferred 
specifications, which we use throughout the remainder of the paper, we use the AIC to choose 
between conventional and relative crisis indicators of the same group (i.e., inflation-, exchange rate- 
and economic growth-based measures). Except for economic growth crises, the relative measures give 
lower AIC values. Preferred specifications are, thus, those shown in Columns (2), (4) and (6).  
In Column (8) we show findings based on an “overall crisis indicator”, Overall_Crisis_(it). This variable 
has entry 1 in year t in case at least one of the crisis indicators in Columns (2), (4), (6) and (7) has entry 
1 and entry 0 otherwise. From Column (8) we see that in the event of any type of economic crisis, on 
average the number of investor-state arbitration cases goes up ceteris paribus by 31% (t-1) and 50% 
(t-2). While an increase in cases by 31% and 50% appears high at first glance, one needs to bear in 
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mind that the mean value of total cases per country-dyad in the estimation sample is low (0.09; cf. 
Table A3). Assuming that a host country has IIAs in force with each of the 74 remaining home 
countries, a semi-elasticity of 50% implies that the number of arbitration claims increases by 
0.09*0.5*74 , that is by about 3 cases, after two years. The corresponding value for t-1 is 2 claims 
more. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
b) Do various types of economic crises matter differently? 
Table 3 allows us to examine the differential impact of crises on arbitration cases. Differential impacts 
depending on the type of crisis are expected,  
(i) because different types of economic crises call for different types of policy interventions, 
each having its own impact on investors in the economy. Generally, the more closely 
policy interventions concern property rights secured by IIAs, the larger the probability of 
a violation and the larger the probability that the violation leads to arbitration. Yet, many 
other determining factors may play a role, e.g. the strength of a foreign investor vis-à-vis 
the host government via informal strategies, which may be particularly pronounced if an 
investor is a large multinational firm and the investment itself is large, e.g. a mining 
company’s influence on a local government. Moreover, differential impacts are likely 
(ii) due to the timing of policy measures in the wake of an economic crisis. While emergency 
measures will be adopted in a timely manner (lag 1 should be sufficient), structural reform 
decision and implementation takes more time and therefore lag 2 of the crisis measures 
may matter more. 
 
As can be seen, we should expect the impact of various types of economic crises to differ by strength 
(semi-elasticity) as well as regarding the timing of their association with arbitration claims. While we 
are not able to provide clear-cut conceptual guidelines to the answer which type of crisis should 
matter most or which should unfold its impact immediately, we suspect that inflation- and currency-
related crises lead to fast implementation of emergency policy measures like controls of capital 
outflows, prize freezes and chances in ordered utility rates. These policy measures do not imply 
changes in entitlements and should thus not be subject to extensive political debates, which delay 
policy implementation. In contrast, especially real economic growth crises but also sovereign debt 
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crises may signal more structural problems which call for more structural economic reforms and, 
hence, lengthy political processes causing implementation lags. 
Our results indeed indicate a more immediate impact of inflation crises (144% increase; Column (4)) 
and exchange rate crises (57%; Column (6)) on the expected value of the number of arbitration cases 
compared to the impact of economic growth crises (43%; Column (2)) and sovereign debt crises (114% 
increase; Column (7)), which are significant with a time lag of 2 periods. Although admittedly it is 
difficult to hypothesize precisely which type of economic crisis matters at what point in time, in the 
light of the above reasoning our empirical results do not seem implausible. 
 
5.2 What about the role of control variables? 
The specifications estimated and displayed in Table 3 include a set of control variables. Together with 
the variables of main interest, these controls are thought to reflect the dimensions of “opportunity” 
and “willingness” shown in Table 2. 
Starting with „opportunity“ from the investor’s perspective, which reflects the formal and informal 
regulations that make a claim possible, BITs in force and membership of the Energy Charter Treaty are 
our proxies for IIAs (with others, like NAFTA-membership, being captured in dyad-fixed effects). Both 
types of IIAs matter, primarily BITs (most of which include some ISDS clause directly as a precondition 
to file a claim). This result has already been well established by related studies (see section 3). A BIT 
in force (Table 3, Column (8)) increases the number of arbitration cases by almost 575 percent. 
Presumably as the Energy Charter Treaty is sector-specific and compared to BITs there is a difference 
in the regional coverage (the Energy Charter Treaty is based primarily on European and Asian 
membership), its impact is weaker when compared to BIT_(it-1).  
A larger FDI stock, if at all, has a weak positive impact on the number of arbitration cases and thus 
supports Freeman’s (2013) claim that the more FDI a country hosts, the larger is the potential for 
arbitral claims. 
The sharp increase in arbitration cases, and the fact that public awareness of IIAs has risen in general 
and among investors in particular have led us to expect a positive association of 
Cumulated_Cases_Home_(it) with the number of arbitration cases. Yet, its effect reported in Table 3 
is negative and significant. It does not vary much across the types of crises (semi-elasticity ranging 
between -1.2 and -1.6). Rather than capturing awareness of investors, this variable may reflect shifts 
in the importance of home countries over time. The negative effect of Cumulated_Cases_Home_(it) 
signifies a shift in the importance of certain countries as claimants’ home base. This shift is consistent 
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with the view that bilateral FDI flows, and hence the likelihood of arbitration cases to arise, from “non-
traditional” home countries increase in importance over time.  
The “willingness” to pursue an arbitral claim from the investor’s point of view is represented by 
indicators of “rule of law” and “quality of regulation” in the host country. It seems quite conceivable 
that the preparedness of the foreign investor to circumvent the local judicial system and to jump 
directly to arbitration is higher in an environment of local courts which are perceived as biased, the 
lack of certain issues which constitute violations of investors’ rights in the domestic law of the host 
country and other weaknesses of the judicial system. An increase in the rule of law index by one unit 
reduces the number of arbitration cases by about 100 percent. A lower quality of regulation (i.e., 
excessive regulations as well as frequent changes thereof) increases the willingness of affected 
investors actually filing a claim. A reduction of the number of arbitration cases between 64 and 85 
percent resulting from an increase in the quality of the regulation index by one unit is suggested in 
Table 3.  
In addition, the mirror image, the “opportunity” from the point of view of the host country’s 
government, supports the assertion of a larger exposure of the host country to arbitral claims. The 
significant negative association of political constraints (“Infeasibility_Policy_Change_(it)”) and the 
number of arbitration cases seems plausible, as in political systems that are characterized by many 
veto-points the probability of implementing disputable policy measures should be lower. With regard 
to the level of development of a host country, it is interesting to note that a lower GDP per capita does 
not seem to lead to increases in the number of arbitration cases. On the one hand, the level of 
development is strongly related to other institutional factors (see Table A4). On the other hand, from 
a substantive point of view, the obligations in BITs across country dyads, independently of the level of 
development of the host country, are similar and so are the measures, host governments need to 
undertake in the course of an economic crisis. 
Finally, the “willingness” of the host country to violate its commitments may depend on factors akin 
to economic crises, namely political crises. Episodes of war (War_(it)) are positively related to 
arbitration cases. This variable also shows a statistically significant impact in the majority of 
specifications estimated. Lastly, we find that regime changes and minor armed conflicts do not matter 
regarding the number of arbitral disputes. 
In sum, the conceptual framework developed by Freeman (2013) proves useful to reflect 
“opportunity” and “willingness” for the analysis. Judging by the resulting signs and the statistical 
significance the factors chosen in our analysis seem to reflect both dimensions well.  
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5.3  Are key results robust to changes in specification and methodology? 
We perform three kinds of sensitivity analyses. First, we use the ZINB estimator instead of the dyad-
fixed effects Poisson estimator (Table 4) in order to account for the presence of zeros-inflation in the 
underlying sample. Second, we conduct a jackknife analysis with respect to the country included in 
our sample (Table 5). A further sensitivity check adds two related institutional variables, i.e. perceived 
corruption and the level of democracy, to the empirical model (Table 6). 
 
a) Results from ZINB 
The related literature inter alia applies the ZINB estimator to investigate arbitration claims (e.g., 
Freeman, 2013; Williams, 2015). We prefer the dyad-fixed effects estimator as it accounts for a 
number of time-invariant factors which might affect arbitration claims and which cannot be 
considered explicitly in the regressions. In addition, the sample used by the ZINB estimator includes a 
large number of country pairs which never record an arbitration case. This might simply be due to the 
fact that there are little or no bilateral FDI flows within those dyads. However, due to serious data 
limitations with respect to bilateral FDI data, we are not able to control explicitly for the amount of 
FDI within a country dyad. This data problem is of lesser concern in the case of the dyad-fixed effects 
Poisson estimator, as dyads which never record an arbitration claim are dropped from the analysis. 
Table 4 shows the results for specifications similar to those displayed in Table 3. Note, we only show 
results using preferred economic crises indicators as suggested by the AIC (cf. Table 3). As we use 
BIT_(ijt) in both parts of the estimations semi-elasticities cannot be derived from the underlying 
regression coefficients. For a substantive interpretation of the results, we stick to incidence rate ratios 
(IRR), defined as IRR = exp(coefficient). Likewise, for interpretation, Logit coefficients can be 
transformed into odds ratios.29 
Turning to the upper part of Table 4, coefficients concerning our main variables of interest support 
results shown in Table 3. For example, Column (5) highlights that the expected number of arbitration 
cases increases by a factor of 1.29 if an economic crisis emerges in t-1, and by a factor of 1.57 if an 
                                                          
29 Count process regression coefficients are defined as the log of [(expected number of cases in case X =1) divided 
by (expected number of cases in case X = 0)]. Exponentiation of the coefficients gives [(expected number of cases 
in case X =1) divided by (expected number of cases in case X = 0)] which is the IRR. Thus, if IRR > 1, an increase 
of X from 0 to 1 increases the expected number of cases by a factor equal to the IRR. For odds ratios a similar 
interpretation applies. 
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economic crisis emerges in t-2. Furthermore, the findings of differences in strength and in the timing 
across the various crisis indicators are confirmed.  
Based on an extended sample coverage, again a strong rule of law as well as high quality regulation 
reduce the expected number of claims. FDI stock now shows a significant positive association with the 
number of arbitration claims, while War_(it) loses its statistical significance. The gravity-type variables 
show a significant relationship with arbitration claims. The signs imply that the closer the cultural ties, 
the larger the number of claims, while the opposite tendency is established for geographical distance. 
It is likely that, to a certain extent, these variables capture the impact of bilateral FDI-flows on 
arbitration claims. Regional dummy-variables indicate that especially Eastern European and post-
Soviet Union countries as well as Latin American countries face international arbitral disputes, which 
is consistent with the information contained in Figure 2. 
An interesting result emerges regarding BIT_(ijt). While it is highly statistically and economically 
significant for the Logit process (lower panel of Table 4) it loses its significance for the count process. 
Thus, a BIT in force is important for the opportunity to bring a claim to an international tribunal, but 
it is of lesser importance for the number of claims recorded in a country-dyad.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
b) Country-Jackknife Analysis 
It is a major concern in this type of analysis that individual countries drive the sign and significance of 
some of our results. We check the robustness of our findings with respect to country inclusion. To this 
end we re-estimate the specification shown in Table 3, Column (8) by dropping the ten most important 
defendant countries in arbitral disputes (cf. Table A1) one by one from our sample. Table 5 contains 
the results for the coefficients on Overall_Crisis_(it-1) (i.e., _b1) and Overall_Crisis_(it-2) (i.e., _b2), 
respectively. Coefficients never turn negative and also keep their statistical significance. They are also 
robust with respect to size. The p-values (i.e., _p) indicate that the null hypothesis H0: _b1 = _b2 = 0 
is always rejected. From this analysis we conclude that results in Table 3, Column (8) are robust to 
dropping individual countries. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
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c) Adding Corruption Perception and Level of Democracy 
When we add corruption perception or the level of democracy to the specification in Table 3, Column 
(8), our substantive conclusions remain valid. Corruption_(it) is measured by using the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index, which ranges between 0 and 100 (highly clean) (variable 
tpi_cpi in Teorell et al., 2017), and Democracy_(it) is operationalized via Freedom House’s imputed 
polity variable which ranges between 0 and 10 (most democratic) (variable fh_polity2 in Teorell et al., 
2017). 
Democracy_(it) and Corruption_(it) show a negative association with the number of arbitral disputes. 
These results confirm the predictions of the liberal approach to international relations, which assumes 
that more democratic countries are more likely to comply with IIAs (Hirsh, 2009). Results are also in 
line with Freeman (2013), yet contradict Williams (2015, 2018).  
As a consequence of the inclusion of these variables, the variables capturing the quality of regulation 
and the feasibility of policy change lose their statistical significance. This is not unexpected as 
Democracy_(it) and Corruption_(it) are highly correlated with the other institutional variables 
included in the analysis. Note that the number of observations substantially drops in case we add 
Corruption_(it) to the model, which is another reason why we do not consider this variable in our main 
specifications. 
We also check the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and the 
number of arbitration cases put forward by Kim (2017). As shown in the last column of Table 6, we 
cannot find support for this argument. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
5.4 Is the impact of economic crises on arbitration cases related to the rule of law in a host 
country?  
Given the fact that the rule of law has a strong and robust effect on the number of arbitration cases, 
we next investigate the possibility that the above result, i.e. economic crises matter for arbitration 
cases, is not uniform across host countries. Table 7 shows the findings of adding an interaction term 
between Overall_Crisis_(it-1) and Overall_Crisis_(it-2), respectively, and Rule_of_Law_(it-1) to the 
specification shown in Table 3, Column (8). While the coefficients of the interaction terms show the 
expected negative sign, i.e., a stronger rule of law reduces the impact of an economic crisis on the 
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number of arbitral disputes, both coefficients fall short of statistical significance. Also, the coefficient 
on the interaction term with Overall_Crisis_(it-2) is relatively small in size.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
However, as argued by Brambor et al. (2006) a graphical visualization of the interaction effects at 
various values of the interacting variable might reveal interesting non-linearities in the economic crisis 
effect even in case the interaction term falls short of statistical insignificance. Turning to Figure 4, we 
see that Hypothesis 2 of an inverse relationship is not implausible, especially for Overall_Crisis_(it-1). 
Figure 4 shows the range of values of the rule of law index on the horizontal axis.30 The minimum value 
of the index in our sample is -2.13 and the maximum value of the index is 2.10 (cf. Table A3). In the 
left panel the effect (coefficient) of Overall_Crisis_(it-1) on the number of arbitration cases is shown. 
The panel demonstrates what Table 6 already suggested, namely that the crisis coefficient decreases 
quantitatively with an increasing rule of law index. Importantly, the coefficient turns statistically 
insignificant for values of the rule of law index above about 0.4. As shown by the underlying 
histogram,31 a substantial amount of sample observations falls in the range of insignificance. 
In contrast, the right panel of Figure 4 for Overall_Crisis_(it-2) demonstrates only a weak moderating 
effect of the rule of law. Given that different types of economic crises impact on arbitral disputes with 
different time lags (cf. Table 3) these findings are consistent with the view that a strong rule of law 
moderates the impact of inflation- and exchange-rate crises on arbitral disputes, while the impact of 
sovereign debt crises and real economic growth crises is not moderated. Why this is the case certainly 
needs further academic scrutiny.  
 
[Figure 4 here] 
  
                                                          
30 Table A6 shows IRRs, and their statistical significance in case Rule_of_Law_(it-1) is evaluated at various values 
(incl. MIN, 75%. Median, Mean, 25% percentile, MAX). 
31 See Berry et al (2012) on the usefulness of histograms for plotting interaction effects. 
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6. Conclusions and Discussion 
Severe macroeconomic turmoil, i.e. economic crises, frequently induce governments to implement 
policy measures, for example controls of capital outflows, changes in ordered public utility rates or 
nationalizations of firms, to stabilize the economy. Foreign investors may perceive some of these 
measures to be in violation of IIAs and, consequently, file a claim at an international arbitration 
tribunal.  
Against this background we investigate empirically whether economic crises have a positive 
association with the number of arbitral disputes (Hypothesis 1) and whether this impact is moderated 
by the strength of the rule of law in a host country (Hypothesis 2). The existing quantitative empirical 
literature puts a focus on institutional capacity (bad governance) and has not as yet established a role 
for economic crises in investor-state arbitration. We argue that one reason for this is the usage of 
overly simplistic measures for economic crises in the related literature (also see, Dupont et al., 2016). 
Conceptually, economic crises increase the willingness of governments to implement disputable policy 
measures. A strong rule of law should reduce both, the willingness of foreign investors to file an 
arbitration claim and the opportunity of governments to implement disputable policy measures. From 
our analysis we conclude that, contrary to established empirical evidence, economic crises matter for 
the number of arbitration cases. In one application (Table 3, Column 8) we find that an economic crisis 
may increase the number of claims by as many as 5 after 2 years. In addition, the effect of crises on 
arbitration cases varies across host countries, depending on their institutional quality. Host countries 
with a strong rule of law need not fear more arbitral disputes in the wake of an economic crisis. This 
finding is consistent with the view that foreign investors are less willing to use international arbitration 
against host countries with strong domestic institutions and / or that host governments working under 
a strong rule have fewer opportunities to violate international agreements.  
Concerning countries characterized by a weaker rule of law index, it seems plausible that they not only 
have a higher likelihood of facing economic crises, but also a higher risk of violating the rule of law due 
to their weaker institutional structure. Their policy interventions must be carefully designed by 
considering commitments vis-à-vis foreign investors, if governments do not want to risk additional32 
arbitration cases. In other words, while these governments may face less restrictions from their 
domestic institutional and legal framework, they should obey their international obligations enshrined 
in IIAs in order to avoid having to face economic crises and arbitration cases at the same time. 
                                                          
32 Additional in the sense of their already higher propensity to face arbitration cases in normal times but also in 
the sense of “in addition to a crisis”. 
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All in all, our results indicate that economic crisis-induced policy changes create conflicts with 
international obligations in IIAs, leading to investor-state arbitration claims, which are not evenly 
spread across countries or time. Countries with weak domestic institutions are those with the 
strongest need to signal to foreign investors that they play by the market rules (Rodrik, 1998). Our 
results imply that these countries are not able to achieve this goal, at least when judged against their 
vulnerability to arbitral disputes. Our results also suggest that IIAs fulfill a key function to provide 
foreign investors with means of enforcement of their rights in an environment of domestic 
institutional deficiencies (Freeman, 2013).  
Our findings also imply that IIAs restrict the room for maneuver of governments especially in times 
when policy interventions are most needed. Governments face tough choices during times of 
economic crises. Not stabilizing an unstable economy is likely to be paired with high and immediate 
economic, social and political costs. Breaching an IIA has potentially negative reputational 
consequences in the competition for international investment and eventually results in substantial 
costs in the long run.  
From a policy perspective a straightforward conclusion emerges from our results: IIAs are not a 
substitute for deficiencies in the rule of law and the institutional environment in host countries. To 
avoid arbitral disputes in general and in the wake of economic crises in particular, countries need to 
strengthen their institutional capacity. However, this is “not something that can be established 
overnight.” (Freeman, 2013, p. 76)  
An alternative possibility is to reform the IIA regime with a focus on giving governments more room 
for maneuver in crisis times (“flexibility”), thus avoiding the vicious circle of the attraction of FDI via 
IIAs and the loss of FDI via negative reputation effects on new FDI from investor-state arbitration 
claims. For example, the G20 have recently reiterated their aims of investment policies with particular 
reference to strengthening investor protection and arbitration as well as preserving the right to 
regulate.33   
Yet, as real world contracts (and treaties) are necessarily incomplete, no BIT will be able to avoid the 
trade-off suggested by the incomplete contracts theory34 between a precise wording and broad 
coverage of possible future scenarios, which strengthens commitment, and the flexibility to account 
for unforeseeable issues arising in the future. Recent treaties (including model treaties) have shown a 
                                                          
33 
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/Annex%20III%20G20%20Guiding%20Principles%
20for%20Global%20Investment%20Policymaking.pdf, see also Johnson et al. (2018); Aisbett et al. (2018) 
34 See van Aaken (2010) for an application of incomplete contracts theory to international investment law. 
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clear tendency to include more detailed definitions of terms and clauses, which have given rise to 
concern in the past (like the fair and equitable treatment standard), making recent IIAs much longer 
in terms of text.  
Our results suggest that an IIA regime reform should put an emphasis on the element of flexibility. 
However, the evidence presented in this paper does not favor the exclusion of ISDS from IIAs 
altogether, nor does it suggest the inclusion of a general exception clause into BITs for times of 
economic crises. These steps would exempt the host country government from liabilities under the 
respective BIT in order to prevent further arbitration cases. There must be a possibility for investors 
to hold governments accountable for their actions. After all, “a crisis is just an extreme instance of 
policy failure” (Rodrik, 1996, p. 27) and, thus, even in the event of an international / global crisis, a 
national government has some responsibility. Governments do not only react to economic crises, they 
also play a key role in generating them. In the light of this discussion, van Aaken’s claim dating back to 
2010 that “a balance needs to be found between commitment and flexibility” is still valid. 
Governments which are not inclined to abandon IIAs at all may react to the threat of large 
compensation payments by sourcing rainy day funds. This is also advisable more generally: First, as 
the majority of BITs does not prescribe time limits for filing claims35, this may create an incentive on 
the part of investors to delay claims and to wait for a first mover to file a claim and for an arbitral 
tribunal to issue a decision, which will ultimately reduce the followers’ risk of filing a claim. Second, 
decisions on arbitration claims often take many years of deliberation. Third, even if governments 
decide to terminate BITs or to renegotiate them to exclude the possibility of international arbitration, 
one must bear in mind that protections granted by BITs are applicable for many years after 
termination. 
Finally, in any reform step, one should bear in mind that rulings of arbitration tribunals play an 
important role in international investment law. Hence, should the current IIA system prevail, it is up 
to these tribunals to apply “a more balanced approach to distributing the risks of economic crises 
between host states and foreign investors.” (Schill, 2007, p. 286) 
  
                                                          
35 Some BITs stipulate a time limit: For example, Article 9, paragraph 7 of China–Republic of Korea BIT (2007, 
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/42/treaty/924) states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of 
paragraph 3 of this Article, an investor may not make a claim pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article if more than 
three years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should have first acquired, 
knowledge that the investor had incurred loss or damage.” Note, however, that a claimant may attempt to 
overcome any time limitation period by using a treaty’s Most Favored Nation provision, if applicable. 
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8. Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Number of Dyads with at least one Arbitral Case over 1987 – 2017  
 
Notes: Treaty-based arbitration cases start in 1987; however, they are a phenomenon host countries have to reckon 
with as of around 1996 when a steep and lasting surge sets in (also see Freeman, 2013); total sum of instances of 
arbitral disputes is 815 and total sum of cases is 961. 
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Figure 2: Number of Cases across Host Regions over 1987 – 2017 
 
Note: Total sum of arbitration cases is 961 over the 1987 – 2017 period. 
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Figure 3: Number of Cases across Home Regions over 1987 – 2017 
 
Note: Total sum of arbitration cases is 961 over the 1987 – 2017 period. 
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Figure 4: Moderating Effect of Rule of Law on Economic Crisis Impact 
 
Notes: The plots show the coefficients (not semi-elasticities) of Overall_Crisis (it-1) and Overall_Crisis (it-2) when 
Rule_of_Law (it-1) is evaluated at values ranging from -2.10 to 2.13. Higher values imply stronger rule of law. 
Table A6 shows corresponding IRRs (i.e., exp(coef)) for Overall_Crisis (it-1) plus their statistical significance. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Economic Crisis Variables 
Economic Crisis Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Conventional Crisis Indicators 
C_Inflation_Rate_Crisis_(it-1) 9455 0.085 0.278 0 1 
C_Inflation_Rate_Crisis_(it-2) 9455 0.104 0.305 0 1 
C_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-1) 9512 0.161 0.367 0 1 
C_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-2) 9512 0.170 0.376 0 1 
C_Economic_Growth_Crisis ((it-1) 9517 0.118 0.322 0 1 
C_Economic_Growth_Crisis ((it-2) 9517 0.124 0.330 0 1 
Relative Crisis Indicators 
R_Inflation_Rate_Crisis_(it-1) 9455 0.017 0.129 0 1 
R_Inflation_Rate_Crisis_(it-2) 9455 0.020 0.140 0 1 
R_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-1) 9512 0.096 0.294 0 1 
R_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-2) 9512 0.092 0.290 0 1 
R_Economic_Growth_Crisis ((it-1) 9517 0.088 0.283 0 1 
R_Economic_Growth_Crisis ((it-2) 9517 0.089 0.284 0 1 
Sovereign Debt Crisis Indicator 
Sov_Debt_Crisis (it-1) 9491 0.018 0.132 0 1 
Sov_Debt_Crisis (it-2) 9491 0.017 0.131 0 1 
Overall Crisis Indicator 
Overall_Crisis (it-1) 9527 0.194 0.395 0 1 
Overall_Crisis (it-2) 9527 0.199 0.400 0 1 
Note: Overall_Crisis_(it) is a combination of preferred economic crisis indicators as detailed in the main text and 
in the Notes to Table 3. 
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Table 2: Regressor Variables included in the Analysis 
Foreign Investor’s View Expected 
Sign 
Host Government’s View Expected 
Sign 
    
Opportunity  Opportunity  
(1) Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT_in_Force_ijt) + (5) Weak Rule of Law (Rule_of_Law_(it)) – 
(2) Member of Energy Charter (Energy_Charter_(it)) + (6) Political Constraints (Infeasibility_Policy_Change_(it)) – 
(3) Foreign Direct Investment in i (Log_FDI_Stock_(it)) ? (7) GDP per Capita (Log_GDP_CAP_(it)) – 
(4) Investor Awareness of Cases (Cumulated_Cases_Home_(jt)) +   
    
Willingness  Willingness  
(8) Quality of Regulation (Quality_of_Regulation_(it)) – (9) Economic Crises (see Table 1) + 
(5) Weak Rule of Law (Rule_of_Law_(it)) – (10) Economic Crises (see Table 1)  
  (10a) Major Armed Conflicts (War_(it)) + 
  (10b) Minor Armed Conflicts (Minor_Conflicts_(it)) + 
  (10c) Regime Switch (Regime_Change_(it)) + 
    
    
Note: Own compilation based on Freeman (2013). 
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Table 3: Main Estimation Results for Number of Cases 
 (Con1) (Con2) (Con3) (Rel1) (Rel2) (Rel3) (Sovereign) (Overall) 
Conventional Crisis Definition (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C_Inflation_Rate_Crisis (i,t-1) 0.398**        
 (0.195)        
C_Inflation_Rate_Crisis (i,t-2) -0.174        
 (0.161)        
C_Economic_Growth_Crisis (i,t-1)  0.155       
  (0.124)       
C_Economic_Growth_Crisis (it-2)  0.356**       
  (0.152)       
C_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-1)   0.324**      
   (0.129)      
C_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-2)   -0.136      
   (0.115)      
Relative Crisis Definition         
R_Inflation_Rate_Crisis (it-1)    0.886***     
    (0.289)     
R_Inflation_Rate_Crisis (it-2)    0.272     
    (0.300)     
R_Economic_Growth_Crisis (it-1)     0.145    
     (0.145)    
R_Economic_Growth_Crisis (it-2)     0.068    
     (0.178)    
R_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-1)      0.454***   
      (0.152)   
R_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-2)      0.149   
      (0.142)   
Sovereign Debt Crisis Indicator         
Sov_Debt_Crisis (it-1)       -0.215  
       (0.175)  
Sov_Debt_Crisis (it-2)       0.760***  
       (0.156)  
Overall Crisis Indicator         
Overall_Crisis (it-1)        0.270** 
        (0.111) 
Overall_Crisis (it-2)        0.427*** 
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        (0.119) 
Rule_of_Law (it-1) -0.998*** -1.038*** -1.039*** -0.959*** -1.041*** -1.012*** -0.967*** -1.049*** 
 (0.292) (0.289) (0.292) (0.299) (0.291) (0.290) (0.293) (0.286) 
Quality_of_Regulation (it-1) -0.697** -0.680** -0.698** -0.695** -0.727** -0.682** -0.716** -0.641** 
 (0.314) (0.316) (0.319) (0.323) (0.321) (0.326) (0.326) (0.313) 
Log_GDP_per_Capita (it-1) -0.164 0.035 -0.192 -0.032 -0.168 -0.194 -0.157 0.100 
 (0.501) (0.476) (0.513) (0.495) (0.503) (0.512) (0.512) (0.477) 
Log_FDI_Stock (it-1) 0.220 0.252 0.287* 0.192 0.264 0.321* 0.263 0.300* 
 (0.161) (0.159) (0.170) (0.152) (0.162) (0.171) (0.165) (0.161) 
BIT_in_Force (ijt-1) 1.859*** 1.895*** 1.879*** 1.861*** 1.882*** 1.888*** 1.891*** 1.909*** 
 (0.456) (0.454) (0.460) (0.456) (0.458) (0.461) (0.455) (0.453) 
Energy_Charter_Treaty (it-1) 1.010** 1.031** 1.046** 1.011** 1.034** 0.980** 1.168** 0.970** 
 (0.492) (0.496) (0.492) (0.491) (0.493) (0.491) (0.579) (0.494) 
Infeasibilty_Policy_Change (it-1) -0.598* -0.605* -0.593* -0.539 -0.620* -0.658** -0.714** -0.641* 
 (0.333) (0.329) (0.331) (0.331) (0.325) (0.333) (0.333) (0.339) 
War (it-1) 0.459* 0.422* 0.484** 0.386 0.474* 0.493** 0.526** 0.396 
 (0.245) (0.245) (0.241) (0.253) (0.246) (0.237) (0.238) (0.248) 
Minor_Armed_Conflicts (it-1) -0.085 -0.123 -0.125 -0.098 -0.099 -0.127 -0.120 -0.156 
 (0.200) (0.196) (0.196) (0.202) (0.195) (0.196) (0.196) (0.197) 
Regime_Change (it-1) -0.118 -0.098 -0.044 -0.130 -0.084 -0.062 -0.066 -0.154 
 (0.219) (0.217) (0.215) (0.221) (0.217) (0.217) (0.211) (0.221) 
Cumulated_Cases_Home (jt-1) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
AIC 4203.303 4231.481 4233.378 4194.670 4242.948 4229.441 4215.901 4218.885 
N 9455 9517 9512 9455 9517 9512 9491 9527 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Columns (1) to (3) are based on conventional (threshold-based) crisis indicators: Columns (4) – (6) are based on relative crisis indicators; 
results from a conditional dyad-fixed effects estimator with time-fixed effects shown; cluster-robust standard errors in (); regression coefficients are displayed; for continuous 
variables 100*coefficient gives the semi-elasticity; 100*(exp(coefficient) - 1) should be used for interpretation of results for binary variables, which also results in a semi-
elasticity interpretation; AIC can be used to compare non-nested models based on same estimation sample (same number of observations); preferred models are indicated by 
AIC value in bold; Overall_crisis_(it) is a dummy variable with entry 1 in case at least one of the crisis indicators in Columns (2), (4), (6) and (7) has entry 1 and 0 otherwise; 
regression results indicate that economic crisis matters for expected value of arbitration cases; thereby inflation and exchange rate crisis lead rather quickly to the filing of 
arbitration cases, while the impact of sovereign debt crises and real economic growth crises lead to arbitration cases with greater time lag. 
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Table 4: Sensitivity Check 1: Results from Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimator 
 (ZINB1) (ZINB2) (ZINB3) (ZINB4) (ZINB5) 
R_Inflation_Rate_Crisis (it-1) 0.694***     
 (0.268)     
R_Inflation_Rate_Crisis (it-2) 0.255     
 (0.317)     
C_Economic_Growth_Crisis (it-1)  0.192    
  (0.126)    
C_Economic_Growth_Crisis (it-2)  0.418***    
  (0.147)    
R_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-1)   0.376***   
   (0.139)   
R_Exchange_Rate_Crisis (it-2)   0.158   
   (0.137)   
Sov_Debt_Crisis (it-1)    -0.053  
    (0.217)  
Sov_Debt_Crisis (it-2)    0.701***  
    (0.201)  
Overall_Crisis (it-1)     0.252** 
     (0.109) 
Overall_Crisis (it-2)     0.453*** 
     (0.117) 
Rule_of_Law (it-1) -0.540*** -0.502*** -0.505*** -0.535*** -0.471*** 
 (0.102) (0.097) (0.097) (0.104) (0.096) 
Quality_of_Regulation (it-1) -0.663*** -0.609*** -0.632*** -0.622*** -0.569*** 
 (0.149) (0.152) (0.149) (0.148) (0.151) 
Log_GDP_per_Capita (it-1) -0.078 -0.125 -0.112 -0.088 -0.148 
 (0.084) (0.082) (0.082) (0.085) (0.083) 
Log_FDI_Stock (it-1) 0.290*** 0.296*** 0.287*** 0.291*** 0.298*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) 
BIT_in_Force (ijt-1) -0.542 -0.519 -0.532 -0.547 -0.518 
 (0.315) (0.292) (0.313) (0.312) (0.292) 
Energy_Charter_Treaty (it-1) 0.199 0.190 0.205 0.204 0.196 
 (0.177) (0.172) (0.176) (0.176) (0.171) 
Infeasibilty_Policy_Change (it-1) 0.256 0.163 0.212 0.210 0.131 
 (0.248) (0.245) (0.249) (0.244) (0.245) 
War (it-1) 0.092 0.086 0.160 0.201 0.085 
 (0.201) (0.202) (0.195) (0.195) (0.202) 
Minor_Armed_Conflicts (it-1) -0.058 -0.047 -0.077 -0.070 -0.063 
 (0.148) (0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.145) 
Regime_Change (it-1) -0.046 -0.057 -0.029 0.027 -0.100 
 (0.209) (0.207) (0.209) (0.208) (0.205) 
Log_Distance_Capital_Cities (ijt) -0.609*** -0.605*** -0.611*** -0.608*** -0.601*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
Common_Language (ijt) 0.379*** 0.396*** 0.380*** 0.374*** 0.405*** 
 (0.145) (0.142) (0.143) (0.144) (0.142) 
Colonial_Relationship (ijt) 1.019*** 1.006*** 1.011*** 1.007*** 0.995*** 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.153) (0.155) (0.154) 
Cumulated_Cases_Home (jt-1) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Eastern Europe and post-Soviet 
Union (it) 
1.251*** 1.320*** 1.227*** 1.240*** 1.296*** 
 (0.379) (0.375) (0.363) (0.377) (0.360) 
Latin America (it) 1.904*** 1.957*** 1.894*** 1.845*** 1.947*** 
 (0.362) (0.361) (0.347) (0.364) (0.345) 
North Africa & the Middle East (it) 0.666 0.774** 0.682 0.679 0.800** 
 (0.388) (0.388) (0.374) (0.388) (0.372) 
Sub-Saharan Africa (it) 0.940** 1.002** 0.897** 0.935** 0.957** 
 (0.403) (0.400) (0.393) (0.404) (0.388) 
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Western Europe and North America 
(it) 
0.679 0.748 0.702 -0.696 0.726 
 (0.438) (0.433) (0.427) (0.437) (0.422) 
East Asia (it) 0.107 0.221 0.140 0.107 0.244 
 (0.522) (0.523) (0.512) (0.523) (0.511) 
South-East Asia (it) 0.662 0.788 0.697 0.669 0.774 
 (0.439) (0.435) (0.425) (0.436) (0.424) 
South Asia (it) 1.153*** 1.254*** 1.154*** 1.135** 1.297*** 
 (0.447) (0.447) (0.433) (0.436) (0.433) 
Pacific (it) 0.232 0.120 0.148 0.238 0.120 
 (1.282) (1.352) (1.302) (1.275) (1.353) 
Constant -3.142** -2.900** -2.773** -2.957** -2.758 
 (1.234) (1.349) (1.327) (1.385) (1.413) 
Prob(always zero)      
BIT_in_Force (ijt-1) -3.129*** -3.087*** -3.104*** -3.114*** -3.088*** 
 (0.346) (0.333) (0.346) (0.346) (0.333) 
Time (ijt) 0.643*** 0.632*** 0.633*** 0.638*** 0.630*** 
 (0.084) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) 
Time^2 (ijt) -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -3.010** -2.768 -2.837 -2.796 -2.713 
 (1.454) (1.592) (1.557) (1.628) (1.687) 
Log(α) 0.640*** 0.561** 0.599*** 0.605*** 0.525** 
 (0.225) (0.234) (0.229) (0.229) (0.235) 
AIC 8276.884 8309.141 8317.170 8317.94 8301.505 
N 391935.000 393240.000 393095.000 392080 393530.000 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Count and Prob (always zero) regressions contain time-fixed effects; it is assumed that 
BIT in Force (t-1) determines Prob (always zero cases); Logit regression also includes years between cases (linear 
and squared) as advised by Beck et al. (1998); Caribbean is base region; cluster-robust standard errors in (); Log(α) 
> 0 indicates overdispersion; Economic Crisis variables in this table are those with the higher AIC in Table 1 (i.e., 
Columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 1) as well as Columns 7 and 8 of Table 1; coefficients of continuous variables in the 
NB2 part (upper part of the table) cannot be interpreted as semi-elasticities as the two ZINB parts share common 
regressors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2008, p. 587); interpretation of coefficients can be based on incidence rate ratios 
(IRR) , respectively, defined as exp(coefficient); for instance, in Column 5 for Rule_of_Law(it-1) the effect is 
exp(-0.471) = 0.62; an increase in the rule of law index by one reduces the number of arbitration cases by a factor 
of 0.62; for Overall_Crisis (it-1) the result is exp(0.252) = 1.29 this means that – ceteris paribus - in case of an 
economic crisis in t-1, the expected number of arbitration cases (in t) increases by a factor of 1.29 compared to a 
situation without economic crisis; the coefficients from of BIT in Force in the (Prob (always zero cases)) equation 
transforms into an odds ratio of exp(-3.1) = 0.045. Thus, the odds of never seeing a case in a dyad in case a BIT 
is in force are much smaller than in case no BIT is in force in a particular country-dyad. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity Check 2: Results from a Host-Country-Jackknife Analysis 
ARG_b1 0.21 EGY_b1 0.29 POL_b1 0.27 
ARG_b2 0.24 EGY_b2 0.42 POL_b2 0.42 
ARG_p 0.02 EGY_p 0.00 POL_p 0.00 
CAN_b1 0.22 ESP_b1 0.32 RUS_b1 0.25 
CAN_b2 0.43 ESP_b2 0.32 RUS_b2 0.45 
CAN_p 0.00 ESP_p 0.00 RUS_p 0.00 
CZE_b1 0.23 IND_b1 0.29 VEN_b1 0.20 
CZE_b2 0.43 IND_b2 0.43 VEN_b2 0.44 
CZE_p 0.00 IND_p 0.00 VEN_p 0.00 
ECU_b1 0.26 MEX_b1 0.24 UKR_b1 0.25 
ECU_b2 0.40 MEX_b2 0.45 UKR_b2 0.46 
ECU_p 0.00 MEX_p 0.00 UKR_p 0.00 
Notes: This table shows results of a country jackknife analysis; the country code shows the country excluded from 
the regression (empirical model as displayed in Column 8 of Table 3); resulting coefficients are marked as b1 and 
b2; b1 = coefficient on Overall_Crisis (t-1); b2 = coefficient on Overall_Crisis (t-2); _p is p-value of test H0: b1 
= b2 = 0; the null hypothesis is always rejected; the table shows that our main results contained in Column 8 of 
Table 3 are robust to dropping of individual countries (as host and home country) from the sample; choice of 
countries is based on the number of arbitration cases the country is involved in; the countries excluded are the 
ones facing most arbitration cases (cf. Table A1). 
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Table 6: Sensitivity Check 3: Corruption and Democracy as Additional Regressors 
 (Corruption) (Democracy) (Democracy 
Squared) 
Overall_Crisis (it-1) 0.257** 0.246** 0.251** 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.111) 
Overall_Crisis (it-2) 0.455*** 0.414*** 0.418*** 
 (0.121) (0.119) (0.119) 
Rule_of_Law (it-1) -1.144*** -0.969*** -0.937*** 
 (0.329) (0.300) (0.306) 
Quality_of_Regulation (it-1) -0.532 -0.570* -0.581* 
 (0.339) (0.312) (0.308) 
Corruption (it-1) -0.695**   
 (0.325)   
Democracy (it-1)  -0.102* 0.083 
  (0.060) (0.228) 
Democracy_Squared (it-1)   -0.017 
   (0.021) 
GDP_per_Capita (it-1) -0.261 -0.033 -0.001 
 (0.544) (0.493) (0.494) 
Inward_FDI_Stock (it-1) 0.469*** 0.322* 0.320** 
 (0.160) (0.165) (0.162) 
BIT_in_Force (ijt-1) 1.707*** 1.873*** 1.875*** 
 (0.504) (0.455) (0.455) 
Energy_Charter_Treaty (it-1) 0.504 0.950* 0.969** 
 (0.533) (0.495) (0.492) 
Infeasibilty_Policy_Change (it-1) -0.582 -0.551 -0.581* 
 (0.354) (0.340) (0.345) 
War (it-1) 0.426 0.433* 0.422* 
 (0.278) (0.240) (0.241) 
Minor_Armed_Conflicts (it-1) -0.108 -0.186 -0.202 
 (0.204) (0.196) (0.196) 
Regime_Change (it-1) -0.125 -0.171 -0.195 
 (0.240) (0.223) (0.222) 
Cumulated_Cases_Home (jt-1) -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
AIC 3902.057 4180.950 4182.031 
N 7989 9384 9384 
Notes: The underlying specification is the one displayed in Column (8) of Table 3; Corruption_(it) is measured 
by using Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, which ranges between 0 and 100 (highly clean) 
(variable tpi_cpi in Teorell et al., 2017); Democracy_(it) is operationalized via Freedom House’s imputed polity 
variable which ranges between 0 and 10 (most democratic) (variable fh_polity2 in Teorell et al., 2017). 
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Table 7: Interaction between Economic Crisis and Rule of Law 
 (Lag1) (Lag2) 
Overall_Crisis (it-1) 0.250** 0.268** 
 (0.117) (0.111) 
Overall_Crisis (it-2) 0.424*** 0.421*** 
 (0.120) (0.127) 
Rule_of_Law (it-1) -1.012*** -1.037*** 
 (0.291) (0.294) 
Overall_Crisis (it-1) X Rule_of_Law (it-1) -0.075  
 (0.096)  
Overall_Crisis (it-2) X Rule_of_Law (it-1)  -0.021 
  (0.105) 
Quality of Regulation (it-1) -0.634** -0.641** 
 (0.313) (0.313) 
Log_GDP_per_Capita (it-1) 0.077 0.092 
 (0.482) (0.472) 
Log_FDI_Stock (it-1) 0.298* 0.300* 
 (0.161) (0.160) 
BIT_in_Force (ijt-1) 1.902*** 1.906*** 
 (0.454) (0.453) 
Energy_Charter_Treaty (it-1) 0.974** 0.973** 
 (0.494) (0.494) 
Infeasibilty_Policy_Change (it-1) -0.637* -0.640* 
 (0.341) (0.340) 
War (it-1) 0.382 0.393 
 (0.251) (0.247) 
Minor_Armed_Conflicts (it-1) -0.157 -0.157 
 (0.197) (0.197) 
Regime_Change (it-1) -0.169 -0.154 
 (0.223) (0.221) 
Cumulated_Cases_Home (jt-1) -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
AIC 4220.276 4220.832 
N 9527 9527 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; results from a conditional dyad-fixed effects estimator with time-fixed effects 
shown; cluster-robust standard errors in (); 465 clusters are used in the calculation of standard errors; Overall 
Crisis variable as defined in the Notes to Table 3; Overall_Crisis (it-k) X Rule_of_Law (it-1) are the interaction 
effects between Rule_of_Law (it-1) and Overall_Crisis (it-1) and Overall_Crisis (it-2), respectively; regression 
coefficients are displayed; for continuous variables 100*coefficient gives the semi-elasticity; 
100*(exp(coefficient) – 1) should be used for interpretation of results for binary variables, which also results in a 
semi-elasticity interpretation; while the coefficient on the interaction terms is statistically insignificant, Figure 4 
implies that the crisis impact on E(arbitration Cases) varies in a meaningful way over values of Rule_of_Law (it-
1).  
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9. Appendix 
 
Table A1: Cases per Host Country 
Hosts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total Cases Host Total Cases 
ALB 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 ARG 61 
ARE 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 VEN 48 
ARG 23 4 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 61 ESP 42 
ARM 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 CZE 37 
AUS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 MEX 32 
AUT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 EGY 30 
AZE 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 ECU 28 
BDI 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 CAN 27 
BEL 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 POL 27 
BEN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 RUS 27 
BFA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 IND 25 
BGD 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 UKR 22 
BGR 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 KAZ 19 
BHR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 PER 18 
BIH 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 USA 18 
BLZ 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 HUN 16 
BOL 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 BOL 15 
BRB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 SVK 14 
CAF 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 KGZ 13 
CAN 11 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 ROU 13 
CHL 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 HRV 12 
CHN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 MDA 12 
CIV 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 LBY 11 
CMR 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 TKM 11 
COD 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 CRI 10 
COG 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 GEO 10 
COL 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 TUR 10 
CPV 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 UZB 10 
CRI 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 ALB 9 
CYP 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 BGR 9 
CZE 21 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 COD 9 
DEU 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 DZA 9 
DNK 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ITA 9 
DOM 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 JOR 9 
DZA 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 LVA 9 
ECU 13 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 PAK 9 
EGY 23 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 IDN 8 
ESP 22 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 42 PAN 8 
EST 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 SRB 8 
ETH 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 LTU 7 
FRA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 CHL 5 
GAB 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 COL 5 
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GBR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 DOM 5 
GEO 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 LAO 5 
GHA 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 LBN 5 
GIN 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 MDG 5 
GMB 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 MNE 5 
GNQ 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 PHL 5 
GRC 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 TZA 5 
GRD 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 VNM 5 
GTM 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 BDI 4 
GUY 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 BGD 4 
HND 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 BIH 4 
HRV 9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 BLZ 4 
HUN 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 CYP 4 
IDN 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 EST 4 
IND 13 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 GIN 4 
IRN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 GMB 4 
IRQ 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 GRC 4 
ITA 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 LKA 4 
JOR 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 MKD 4 
KAZ 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 MNG 4 
KEN 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 SLV 4 
KGZ 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 TUN 4 
KHM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 URY 4 
KNA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 YEM 4 
KOR 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 ARE 3 
KWT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ARM 3 
LAO 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 AZE 3 
LBN 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 CAF 3 
LBR 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 CHN 3 
LBY 7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 CMR 3 
LCA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 DEU 3 
LKA 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 ETH 3 
LSO 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 GAB 3 
LTU 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 GHA 3 
LVA 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 GRD 3 
MAR 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 GTM 3 
MDA 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 HND 3 
MDG 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 KOR 3 
MEX 20 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 32 MYS 3 
MKD 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 OMN 3 
MLI 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 PRY 3 
MMR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 SAU 3 
MNE 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 SEN 3 
MNG 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 SVN 3 
MOZ 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 ZWE 3 
MUS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 AUS 2 
MYS 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 BEL 2 
NER 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 COG 2 
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NGA 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 CPV 2 
NIC 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 GNQ 2 
OMN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 IRQ 2 
PAK 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 KEN 2 
PAN 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 LBR 2 
PER 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 LSO 2 
PHL 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 MAR 2 
PNG 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 MOZ 2 
POL 23 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 MUS 2 
PRT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 NGA 2 
PRY 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 NIC 2 
ROU 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 PNG 2 
RUS 13 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 27 TGO 2 
RWA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 THA 2 
SAU 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 UGA 2 
SDN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 AUT 1 
SEN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 BEN 1 
SLV 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 BFA 1 
SRB 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 BHR 1 
SSD 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 BRB 1 
SVK 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 CIV 1 
SVN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 DNK 1 
SYC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 FRA 1 
SYR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 GBR 1 
TGO 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 GUY 1 
THA 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 IRN 1 
TJK 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 KHM 1 
TKM 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 KNA 1 
TTO 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 KWT 1 
TUN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 LCA 1 
TUR 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 MLI 1 
TZA 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 MMR 1 
UGA 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 NER 1 
UKR 20 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 PRT 1 
URY 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 RWA 1 
USA 9 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 SDN 1 
UZB 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 SSD 1 
VEN 29 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 48 SYC 1 
VNM 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 SYR 1 
YEM 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 TJK 1 
ZAF 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 TTO 1 
ZWE 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 ZAF 1 
Cases 715 148 48 20 15 6 0 0 9 961   
Instance Cases 715 74 16 5 3 1 0 0 1 815   
Host Countries          132   
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Table A2: Cases by Home Country 
Homes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total Cases Home Total Cases 
ARE 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 USA 173 
ARG 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 NLD 92 
AUS 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 GBR 79 
AUT 18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 DEU 59 
BELLUX 33 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 44 FRA 53 
BHR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 CAN 51 
BMU 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ESP 50 
BOL 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 BELLUX 44 
BRB 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 ITA 35 
CAN 36 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 TUR 30 
CHE 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 CHE 23 
CHL 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 AUT 21 
CHN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 CYP 21 
COL 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 RUS 20 
CRI 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 GRC 16 
CYM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 UKR 12 
CYP 17 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 SWE 9 
CZE 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 MUS 8 
DEU 37 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 59 BRB 7 
DNK 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 CHL 7 
EGY 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 JOR 7 
ESP 38 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 NOR 7 
EST 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ARE 6 
FIN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 CHN 6 
FRA 37 4 1  1 0 0 0 0 53 KWT 6 
GBR 60 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 79 POL 6 
GIB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ARG 5 
GRC 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 CZE 5 
HKG 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 IND 5 
HRV 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 ISR 5 
HUN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 PRT 5 
IND 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 AUS 4 
IRL 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 DNK 4 
IRN 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 KAZ 4 
ISR 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 KOR 4 
ITA 26 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 MYS 4 
JOR 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 PAN 4 
JPN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 SGP 4 
KAZ 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 ZAF 4 
KOR 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 EGY 3 
KWT 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 HRV 3 
LBN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 JPN 3 
LIE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 LBN 3 
LTU 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 LTU 3 
LVA 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 QAT 3 
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MDA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 HKG 2 
MEX 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 IRN 2 
MLT 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 LVA 2 
MUS 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 MEX 2 
MYS 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 MLT 2 
NLD 67 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 92 OMN 2 
NOR 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 SAU 2 
OMN 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 SVN 2 
PAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 BHR 1 
PER 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 BMU 1 
POL 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 BOL 1 
PRT 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 COL 1 
QAT 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 CRI 1 
RUS 17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 CYM 1 
SAU 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 EST 1 
SDN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 FIN 1 
SGP 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 GIB 1 
SRB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 HUN 1 
SVN 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 IRL 1 
SWE 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 LIE 1 
THA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 MDA 1 
TUN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 PER 1 
TUR 21 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 30 SDN 1 
TWN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 SRB 1 
UKR 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 12 THA 1 
USA 102 20 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 173 TUN 1 
UZB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 TWN 1 
VEN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 UZB 1 
VGB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 VEN 1 
ZAF 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 VGB 1 
Cases 715 148 48 20 15 6 0 0 9 961   
Instance Cases 715 74 16 5 3 1 0 0 1 815   
Home Countries          75   
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Table A3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cases (ijt) overall 0.09 0.36 0.00 9.00 Energy_Charter_Treaty (it-1) overall 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
  between  0.12 0.05 1.24   between  0.35 0.00 0.90 
  within  0.34 -1.14 8.43   within  0.16 -0.72 0.90 
Instance_case (ijt) overall 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 Infeasibilty_Policy_Change (it-1) overall 0.33 0.21 0.00 0.73 
  between  0.07 0.05 0.81   between  0.16 0.00 0.71 
  within  0.26 -0.73 1.03   within  0.13 -0.16 0.92 
Rule_of_Law (it-1) overall -0.22 0.82 -2.13 2.10 War (it-1) overall 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 
  between  0.79 -1.71 1.93   between  0.11 0.00 0.86 
  within  0.19 -1.04 0.67   within  0.17 -0.81 1.00 
Quality_of_Regulation (it-1) overall 0.06 0.36 -1.55 1.16 Minor_Armed_Conflicts (it-1) overall 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
  between  0.32 -0.82 0.83   between  0.29 0.00 1.00 
  within  0.18 -0.72 0.77   within  0.24 -0.78 1.12 
Log_GDP_per_Capita (it-1) overall 8.34 1.27 4.81 11.07 Regime_Change (it-1) overall 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
  between  1.24 5.44 10.95   between  0.13 0.00 1.00 
  within  0.22 6.32 9.15   within  0.21 -0.58 1.02 
Log_FDI_Stock (it-1) overall 9.55 2.06 2.24 15.67 Cumulated_Cases_Home (jt-1) overall 19.49 31.11 0.00 167.00 
  between  1.79 3.61 14.92   between  23.40 0.00 96.83 
  within  0.99 5.12 12.19   within  20.44 -59.98 102.02 
BIT_in_Force (ijt-1) overall 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 Time (ijt) overall 13.20 8.73 0.00 32.00 
  between  0.39 0.00 1.00   between  5.12 0.76 29.00 
  within   0.24 -0.25 1.56   within   7.14 -11.23 31.20 
N= 9527: n = 465: T-bar = 20.5            
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Table A4: Pairwise Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Rule_of_Law (it-1) 1.00           
(2) Quality_of_Regulation (it-1) 0.04 1.00          
(3) Log_GDP_per_Capita (it-1) 0.67 0.25 1.00         
(4) Log_FDI_Stock (it-1) 0.45 0.14 0.66 1.00        
(5) BIT_in_Force (ijt-1) 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.13 1.00       
(6) Energy_Charter_Treaty (it-1) 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.13 1.00      
(7) Infeasibilty_Policy_Change (it-1) 0.40 0.22 0.30 0.27 0.09 0.04 1.00     
(8) War (it-1) -0.15 -0.03 -0.13 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 1.00    
(9) Minor_Armed_Conflicts (it-1) -0.18 -0.12 -0.24 0.11 -0.01 -0.13 0.06 0.11 1.00   
(10) Regime_Change (it-1) -0.21 -0.03 -0.19 -0.16 -0.06 -0.04 -0.22 0.11 0.00 1.00  
(11) Cumulated_Cases_Home (jt-1) -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 1.00 
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Table A5: Data Sources 
Variable  Data Source 
Cases (ijt) Wellhausen (2016) and UNCTAD’s Investment Arbitration database 
Rule_of_Law (it-1) Teorell et al., (2017): variable: wbgi_rle (Kaufmann et al., 2011) 
Quality_of_Regulation (it-1) Derived using data from Teorell et al., (2017): variables wbgi_rqe and wbgi_rle (see main text) 
Log_GDP_per_Capita (it-1) Teorell et al., (2017): variable: wdi_gdpcapcon2010 (WDI Database) 
Log_FDI_Stock (it-1) UNCTAD's Foreign Direct Investment Database 
BIT_in_Force (ijt-1) UNCTAD's International Investment Agreements Database 
Energy_Charter_Treaty (it-1) International Energy Charter Organisation (data provided on their homepage) 
Infeasibilty_Policy_Change (it-1) Teorell et al., (2017): variable: h_Polcon3 (Henisz, 2002) 
War (it-1) Derived using data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset; conflicts with intensity = 2 
Minor_Armed_Conflicts (it-1) Derived using data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset; conflicts with intensity = 1 
Regime_Change (it-1) Derived using data from Teorell et al., (2017): variable p_durable (Marshall et al., 2017) 
Cumulated_Cases_Home (jt-1) Derived from data on Cases (ijt) 
Time (ijt) Derived from data on Cases (ijt) 
Log_Distance_Capital_Cities (ijt) CEPII Distance dataset 
Common_Language (ijt) CEPII Language dataset 
Colonial_Relationship (ijt) CEPII Language dataset 
Host_Region (it) Teorell et al., (2017): variable: ht_region (Wahman et al., 2013) 
Inflation_rate_Crisis (it) Derived using data from Teorell et al., (2017): variables:  wdi_inflation and imf_inflch (WDI and IMF Databases) 
Exchange_rate_Crisis (it)  
Derived using data from Teorell et al., (2017): variable: pwt_xr (Penn World Tables) and Worldbank Global Economic Monitor data: 
variable: DPANUSSPB 
Economic_Growth_Crisis (it) Derived using data from Teorell et al., (2017): variable: wdi_gdpgr (WDI Database) 
Sov_Debt_Crisis (it) Derived using Laeven and Valencia (2012) database on Systemic Banking Crises 
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Table A6: Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) for Interaction Model 
Rule_of_Law (it-1) value IRR Std. Error z-value p-value 
2.10 (MAX) 1.10 0.29 0.35 0.73 
1 1.19 0.21 1.00 0.32 
0.37 (75%) 1.25 0.17 1.66 0.10 
0 1.28** 0.15 2.13 0.03 
-0.22 (Mean) 1.30** 0.15 2.38 0.02 
-0.35 (Median) 1.32** 0.15 2.50 0.01 
-0.85 (25%) 1.36*** 0.16 2.66 0.01 
-1 1.38** 0.17 2.62 0.01 
-2.13 (MIN) 1.51** 0.30 2.06 0.04 
Note: This table shows the corresponding IRR values of Overall_Crisis (it-1) (defined as exp(coef)), including 
their statistical significance, to Figure 4. 
